Mercy Corps ©

REBUILDING THE BREADBASKET
WHY AJ JAZIRAH IS CENTRAL TO SUDAN'S FOOD SECURITY

Crisis Analysis Global

APRIL 2026

MERCY CORPS

Contents

Maps and figures

Executive Summary

This brief examines the catastrophic collapse of the agricultural system in Aj Jazirah State, Sudan's agricultural heartland, due to political disruption, conflict, and climate shocks. It highlights how the region has devolved from the nation's primary breadbasket into a zone of emergency-level food insecurity as a combined result of structural weaknesses that predate the conflict, the destruction of the agricultural market system during the war, and climate vulnerabilities. Despite this recent history, the state also offers a lifeline for the Sudanese population and a pathway to resilience, with agricultural production already resuming at some levels in 2025. Restoring the formerly fundamental role of Aj Jazirah's agricultural system in Sudanese food security will require a multi-year effort combining long-term investment and capacity building at every level of the agricultural value chain with immediate consumption support to help local populations and small businesses survive in the short term.

The agricultural system of Aj Jazirah has suffered a systemic collapse, driven by years of declining governance and maintenance, recurrent climate shocks, and the deliberate wartime targeting of agricultural and market infrastructure. Before the war, Aj Jazirah produced roughly 45% of the country's sorghum and over 50% of its wheat, facilitated by one of the world's largest centrally managed irrigation systems, spanning about 1 million hectares. This system supported millions of producers and seasonal workers, including Kanabi communities whose labor has long been essential but who have historically been marginalized. Despite its massive scale, Aj Jazirah's pre-war agricultural output masked deepening structural weaknesses, notably chronic underinvestment in canal operation and maintenance, siltation and flood damage dating back to at least 2016, rising diesel and input costs, and an overreliance on centralized processing facilities concentrated in Khartoum, which increased systemic risks.

The war accelerated this pre-existing decline into a full-scale system breakdown. During the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) occupation of Aj Jazirah (from December 2023 to early 2025), management of the irrigation scheme ground to a halt, inputs and machinery were seized from warehouses, markets and seed banks were looted, and transportation routes became inaccessible and unaffordable at critical moments in the summer harvest and winter planting cycles. Although the re-entry of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) into the state in early 2025 reduced major hostilities and enabled some seasonal activity to resume, safe mobility remains uneven, due to the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in fields and along roads, tertiary canal blockages and staffing gaps, which limit irrigation performance, and the ongoing rise in transaction costs as a result of restrictions and high fuel prices. The amount of land cultivated in Aj Jazirah fell sharply over 2024/2025, with irrigated wheat and rainfed sorghum output dropping to a multi-year low and several localities facing acute levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 to 5).[1] While life-saving for affected populations in the immediate term, humanitarian aid will not address these systemic failures or restore the commercial agriculture production desperately needed for country-wide food security.

1 The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) categorizes the severity of acute food insecurity: IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) concerns households facing significant food consumption gaps or only able to meet minimum needs through unsustainable coping strategies; IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) reflects large-scale food consumption gaps, very high or acute malnutrition, and excess mortality risk; IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine) represents extreme lack of food, starvation, destitution, and death, with famine declared when these conditions affect a population at scale.

Key takeaways

Despite the devastation of recent years, Aj Jazirah can recover its role as the breadbasket of Sudan and lay the foundation for long-term food security in the country. Supporting this transition will require a decisive pivot from short-term, emergency-oriented humanitarian interventions to multi-year, systems-level investment with the following priorities:

1. **Longer-term, forward-looking investments, with a systems-based approach and a focus on resilience**. Investments must go beyond restoring system performance and work to build a sustainable agricultural system that will cement Sudanese food security in the long term.

2. **Inclusive access to economic opportunity** by guaranteeing safe mobility for all market actors, protecting and enabling marginalized groups, especially Kanabi communities, and facilitating broader participation in post-harvest handling, processing, and selling.

3. **Multi-year programs in partnership with local entities**, which are aligned to agricultural seasons and empower the local private sector to lead on developing a better agricultural system, supported by international expertise.

4. **Continuing short-term, market-based humanitarian support to help vulnerable communities address immediate food insecurity**. This should prioritise activities that enhance, rather than undermine market functionality, such as cash to communities and vital local businesses.

Map 1. Map of Sudan, showing Aj Jazirah State and its irrigation scheme.
(Source: Mercy Corps)

Introduction

This brief examines the catastrophic collapse of the agricultural system in Aj Jazirah State, Sudan's agricultural heartland, due to political disruption, conflict, and climate shocks. It highlights how the region has devolved from the nation's primary breadbasket into a zone of emergency-level food insecurity, as a combined result of structural weaknesses that predate the conflict, the destruction of the agricultural market system during the war, and climate vulnerabilities. Despite this recent history, there is now an opportunity to rebuild and surpass pre-war agricultural production, laying the foundations for long-term food security in Sudan. The brief first offers a timeline of the war in Aj Jazirah and its impact on the state's irrigated agriculture scheme. It then provides key takeaways from the conflict period and recommendations for donors and implementers to rebuild a resilient agricultural market system.

Aj Jazirah's pre-war significance and vulnerabilities

Aj Jazirah State has historically been considered Sudan's agricultural breadbasket, strategically situated in the fertile plain between the Blue and White Niles. In 2021, it produced at least 45% of the country's sorghum and over 50% of its wheat, two key national food staples (FAO 2022). Undergirding this production is the Aj Jazirah Irrigation Scheme, one of the world's largest irrigation systems under a single management entity, spanning approximately one million hectares and accounting for 42% of Sudan's total irrigated cropland. Until the war, the irrigation scheme was a source of income for almost two million farmers and seasonal workers in Aj Jazirah and a pillar of national food security (Damrad 2015, Abd Elkreem & Jaspars 2025, FAO 2025c).

Yet structural weaknesses were eroding the scheme's resilience well before the war. Governance and policy shifts from the mid-2000s onwards undermined scheme management and cost recovery, while tenant–laborer tensions – particularly affecting Kanabi seasonal workers – strained the social fabric of the agricultural network (Lighthouse Reports 2025). Recurrent flooding damaged primary and tertiary canals, siltation accumulated amid chronic underfunding of operations and maintenance, and rising fuel and input prices increased transaction costs for farmers (FAO 2025c; OCHA 2025). The Aj Jazirah scheme also suffered the same structural vulnerabilities as the rest of Sudan's agricultural system, particularly a reliance on storage and agroprocessing facilities concentrated in Khartoum, leaving no redundancies in the event of a nationwide shock.

45% of Sudan's sorghum produced in Aj Jazirah in 2021.

Over 50% of its wheat.

An irrigation system spanning approximately **1 million hectares.**

The system accounts for **42%** of Sudan's irrigated cropland.

A source of income for **almost two million** farmers and seasonal workers before the war.

Extreme climate vulnerability

Aj Jazirah is also extremely vulnerable to climate shocks. Climate data for the 2011–2025 rainfall window (CHIRPS) shows an intense degree of variability during the July–August core period in the state, with several "record/unprecedented" flood years observed since 2016, punctuated by dry years that reduce biomass and increase irrigation needs. Field and satellite evidence from the scheme indicates a range of compounding effects: floods lead to siltation, bank erosion, canal overtopping, and drainage backflow, while ensuing droughts result in water delivery shortfalls and the underperformance of tertiary networks. In addition, Sudan has been classified as one of the African countries most affected by desertification (FEWSNET 2025).



Figure 1. Aj Jazirah Rainfall Analysis: July–August Period (2011–2025).
(Source: CSB Climate Hazards Center – CHIRPS)

Aj Jazirah's location between the Blue and White Niles, while beneficial for irrigation, also repeatedly exposes the state to riverine flooding caused by upstream hydrology, as well as intermittent droughts that increase irrigation demand and depress yields. These hazards only weakly correlate with local rainfall, meaning that years of "normal" local precipitation can still bring damaging floods that overwhelm canals, embankments, rural roads, and storage (Al-Taher, R. H. et al. 2025, OCHA 2025).[2] For example, major flooding events between 2020 and 2024 were primarily driven by riverine overflow due to heavy monsoon rains in the Ethiopian highlands affecting the Blue Nile and higher water levels in Lake Victoria flowing into the White Nile.

In 2023–2024, the impact of the conflict prevented immediate repair of flood damage, leaving stretches of the network degraded or unmanaged heading into subsequent seasons.[3]

Conflict escalation and agricultural system decline

By late 2023, the war in Sudan had rapidly expanded into Aj Jazirah State, and in December 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the state's capital, Wad Madani, where much of its agricultural research is concentrated (SHRH 2025, ACLED 2025). RSF control of key administrative and irrigation hubs brought scheme management to an immediate halt. RSF units also seized seeds, fertilizers, fuel, and machinery from warehouses; looted or destroyed seed banks and markets; and immobilized the institutions responsible for coordinating irrigated agriculture, occupying critical administrative offices (ACLED 2025, SHRH 2025, OHCHR 2025). Historically marginalized

2 Structural hydrology (Blue/White Nile drivers), weak coupling to local rainfall, and flood/drought exposure (see CHIRPS/river notes).
3 2011–2025 variability (CHIRPS), "record/unprecedented" flood years since 2016, and overlap with 2023–24 operations and maintenance standstill.

Kanabi communities – seasonal laborers indispensable to Aj Jazirah agricultural production – became the target of violent attacks, with reports of arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and violence in several localities (Lighthouse 2025). In terms of timing, the RSF takeover overlapped with key periods in the crop calendar – the end of the summer sorghum harvest and the start of winter wheat planting – which caused the impact of looting and reduced field access to cascade into subsequent seasons. With central marketplaces (e.g. Wad Madani) under attack, all aspects of the agricultural market system were affected, and links between input suppliers, farmers, processors, and consumers were severed. By August 2024, Aj Jazirah's agricultural production had dropped by 72%.



Figure 2. Timeline of key events impacting food systems in Aj Jazirah. **(Source: Mercy Corps)**

Meanwhile, on a national level, Sudan's agricultural capacity was being destroyed, its warehouses damaged or emptied, and its transportation routes disrupted. The widespread looting and destruction of Khartoum paralysed most large-scale packaging, milling, and processing sites, with the agribusiness conglomerates that dominate Sudan's agricultural sector ceasing operations. This left the few farmers in Aj Jazirah still able to continue cultivation without a buyer for their crops.

In early 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) regained control of much of Aj Jazirah, including Wad Madani. Major hostilities decreased and some irrigation scheme functions resumed. On-site canal assessments, water releases, and a 2025 harvest were recorded in some parts of the scheme, while the Ministry of Irrigation reported that it had repaired infrastructure in others. Functionality remained uneven, however, due to the damage to tertiary canals, restricted access to fields containing unexploded ordnance (UXO), persistent management and technical staff shortages, and a lack of maintenance resources (FAO 2025c; FAO 2025d; UNMAS 2025). Beyond Aj Jazirah, the wider Sudanese agricultural system continued to be strained, with high transportation costs and reduced storage and processing capacity.



Map 2. Expected severity of UXO contamination based on types of violent events occurring between September 2023 and February 2025. **(Source: ACLED/Mercy Corps)**

Only 20% of planned food assistance reached recipients between April and May 2025.

41% of the Aj Jazirah population will face acute food insecurity by May 2026.

Around 1.1 million people displaced from Aj Jazirah.

1.09 million have returned as of January 2026.

212,000 Aj Jazirah residents remain internally displaced.

Cultivated land in the state shrank **60%** in 2024/2025.

Despite these improvements, the humanitarian situation in Aj Jazirah remained dire. Between April and May 2025, only around 20% of planned food assistance reached intended recipients due to logistical and administrative challenges. According to the most recent IPC projections, 41% of the state's population will face acute levels of food insecurity between February and May 2026 (IPC 2025). There were also reports of increased atrocities against Kanabi communities in this period (Lighthouse 2025).

Between December 2023 and December 2024, approximately 1.1 million people were displaced from Aj Jazirah (ACAPS 2025a, 2025b, IOM 2025) to neighbouring states, including Khartoum, Gedaref, and Kassala, or internally within Aj Jazirah. After SAF gains, 2025 saw an increase in returns, often to rural towns and villages where returnees had family ties and a semblance of safety. These returns were limited, however, by inadequate services, fears of UXOs, and sporadic violent incidents. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s Displacement Tracking Matrix, as of 27 January 2026, at least 1.09 million people have returned to their areas of origin, leaving 212,000 Aj Jazirah residents still displaced internally (IOM 2025).

Critically, by 2025, many scheme engineers, irrigation technicians, and agronomists had already found work elsewhere or left the country entirely. This has created long-term capacity gaps in scheme management, water operations, and the extension services that connect farmers with scientific research, technologies, and best practices (IOM 2025; ACAPS 2025; FAO 2025c). Labor supply and social cohesion were also worsened by the attacks on and exclusion of Kanabi communities providing historically essential seasonal work. Thus, even where fields in Aj Jazirah were physically accessible, land preparation, harvesting, and post-harvest handling could not be organized at the needed scale. Beyond the physical risks of the war, loss of documentation (IDs or land papers) has complicated tenancy and wage arrangements, while limited development assistance has hindered an equitable return to agricultural livelihoods.

Food system status one year on

One year on from the SAF's re-entry, farmers across Aj Jazirah continue to face severely constrained access to affordable inputs, machinery, and finance, with high transportation costs and UXO contamination further limiting crop production. These constraints raise production costs, restrict labor and trade mobility, and disincentivise market actors from re-engaging with the agricultural system. Satellite and field assessments indicate that cultivated land in Aj Jazirah shrank by approximately 60% in the 2024/2025 season (see Figure 3 below), reflecting these challenges. Irrigated wheat production reached a multi-year low, and while the land area cultivated for rainfed sorghum expanded in 2023/2024 compared to the previous season, production levels declined in the following season as hostilities expanded through the summer. Areas where farmers lacked labor or were unable to secure machinery and fuel within the seasonal window were particularly affected.



Figure 3. 2020–2025 irrigated wheat and sorghum production. **(Source: CSFAM)**

Household income sources have shifted significantly, with many families now relying on casual labor, petty trade, and remittances as agricultural income becomes increasingly unpredictable. These coping strategies, although essential, are not sufficient to offset sustained losses in agricultural livelihoods. Food insecurity remains acute, with several localities registering in IPC Phase 3–5, and households reporting negative coping strategies, such as consuming seed stocks, reducing meal frequency, or selling productive assets. These erosion patterns reduce future production capacity and further entrench vulnerability.[4]

Overall, one year after the SAF re-entry, Aj Jazirah's food system is experiencing a partial and uneven recovery constrained by high operating costs; degraded infrastructure; labor shortages; limited transport, storage, and processing capacity; and ongoing access barriers. Without accelerated investment across the entire agricultural market system, the state risks another year of reduced production, lower incomes, and continued food insecurity.

4 Shift in household income sources (casual labor, small business, remittances); locality-level IPC Phase 3–5; negative coping (seed consumption, asset sales).

Key takeaways: Holistic solutions to complex problems

Long-term investment, not merely short-term aid: Humanitarian assistance saves lives but cannot rebuild crop production or bolster agricultural resilience at the scale needed in Aj Jazirah and across Sudan. Recovery hinges on multi-year development assistance and investment to restore canals and irrigation infrastructure, advance existing climate-responsive management plans, and rebuild the agricultural supply chain from input provision all the way up to product sales. Given the pre-war decline in governance and maintenance of the irrigation scheme in Aj Jazirah, assistance must go beyond repairing visible war damage in order to resolve structural inadequacies in operations, maintenance, and institutions. Investment is also needed to remedy pre-war systemic weaknesses by decentralizing storage and processing facilities and moving them closer to agricultural areas. *With these measures, Aj Jazirah has the potential to be the bedrock of food security in Sudan, guaranteeing robust production of the country's staple crops.*

Inclusive access is integral to economic growth: Economic recovery depends on safe mobility, predictable access, and widespread economic participation. Demining activities, negotiations to ensure free, unlimited access to fields, and support for land security will be crucial in restoring full crop production in Aj Jazirah. Kanabi workers must be able to circulate and work safely, and particular attention must be paid to mitigating conflict and addressing grievances. Meanwhile, a wider range of entrepreneurs must be supported in developing more diverse and smaller-scale storage, transportation, and processing facilities to reduce risks, increase post-harvest handling efficiency, and expand economic participation. *Guaranteeing adequate protection, access, and inclusion will maximize economic productivity in Aj Jazirah and support wider food security.*

Multi-year funding and local partnerships: Long-term development assistance is needed to achieve the aims above, and program plans must be aligned with the agricultural calendar. They must also consider the sequencing of infrastructure rehabilitation, supply chain recovery, and enterprise development, so that multiple streams of activity are supported simultaneously while meeting the pace of the local economy to guarantee rapid agricultural recovery. A key means of doing this is by enabling a wide range of local institutions, including cooperatives, local enterprises, water-user groups, and national NGOs, to drive the process, aided by international technical support, financing, and market linkages. *Rebuilding production through local institutions will ensure a sustainable agricultural market system with durable economic linkages, robust competition, and reduced vulnerability.*

Humanitarian support complements investment: Short-term consumption support for vulnerable communities remains necessary to address immediate food security needs. However, large-scale in-kind donations can force trusted local enterprises out of business, drive up prices for households not receiving aid, reduce long-term supplies of basic goods, and remove the incentive to restart crop production. *With this in mind, adopting market-based approaches to humanitarian assistance, such as cash and vouchers, can stabilize consumption and purchasing power while maintaining the predominance of local businesses within communities. This will durably enhance market resilience, rather than undermining it.*

Recommendations

For donors

- **Provide multi-year funding**: Fund multi-year programs that look beyond immediate production gains and combine infrastructure recovery, technical and capacity building, and supply chain development, alongside risk mitigation and climate adaptation.

- **Require and resource localized market, conflict, and climate analysis**: Ensure that programming begins with an in-depth assessment of the local context, then support frequent light-touch updates to ensure that programs are adapted to current conditions and contextual changes.

- **Enable flexible program approaches**: Empower locally-driven activities through flexible approaches, such as cash and voucher support, credit guarantees, or private-sector financing, aimed at developing more sustainable, competitive, and inclusive systems and communities.

- **Support programming that addresses key system enablers**: Guarantee inclusion and resilience in local communities and systems by supporting key functions such as governance, conflict mitigation, demining, and policy change.

For implementers

- **Develop mutually beneficial partnerships with capable local institutions**: Co-develop activities with local cooperatives and community groups, businesses, NGOs, and government, so that programs build local capacity and resilience while fostering competitive and inclusive market systems. Ensure that these programs align external expertise with local capacity and timeframes.

- **Facilitate state-level coordination that aligns programming**: Ensure that programs addressing diverse aspects of the Aj Jazirah economic and social system (e.g., agricultural development, governance, conflict mitigation, demining, etc.) are coordinated and implemented in complementary ways. This will enhance the impact of all programs and allow for productive, resilient systems.

- **Utilize market-based humanitarian approaches**: Monitor market performance and adjust humanitarian approaches to support market recovery, thereby reducing the need for humanitarian aid.

Conclusion

The war that began in April 2023 dealt a devastating blow to the Aj Jazirah Irrigation Scheme, a system already weakened by poor management, chronic underinvestment, and cumulative siltation and flood damage from recurring climate shocks. The war also destroyed a national agricultural market system that depended on centralized agro-processing facilities in Khartoum run by a small number of agricultural conglomerates. When the RSF occupied Aj Jazirah, the state's agricultural system ground to a halt, with inputs and machinery seized from warehouses, markets and seed banks looted, and transportation routes rendered inaccessible and unaffordable at critical moments of the summer harvest and winter planting cycles. Over one million people were displaced from their homes, and vulnerable communities forming the backbone of agricultural labor in Sudan, especially Kanabi communities, were targeted. While the return of the SAF enabled a resumption of some agricultural activity, damaged canals and irrigation infrastructure, UXO hazards and access restrictions, high costs, and a shortage of market actors all limited production.

Despite the devastation of recent years, Aj Jazirah can recover its role as the breadbasket of Sudan and lay the foundation for long-term food security in the country. To facilitate this recovery, donors and international agencies will need to work collaboratively to support long-term development programs aimed at rebuilding climate-smart irrigation systems; supporting performance-based scheme management; encouraging inclusive market access; and developing a more diverse, competitive, and decentralized agricultural market system.

Bibliography

Abd Elkreem, T. and Jaspars, S. (2025) "Sudan's catastrophe: the role of changing dynamics of food and power in the Gezira agricultural scheme", *Disasters*, 49(1), e12663.

ACAPS (2025a) *Sudan – Key needs and risks for IDP returnees in Aj Jazirah*. Thematic Report, July 2025.

ACAPS (2025b) *Sudan – Food security and nutrition analysis: barriers, impacts, and opportunities*. Thematic Report, October 2025.

ACAPS (2025c) *Sudan – Scenarios 2025*. Anticipatory analysis, November 2025.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2025) *Sudan Conflict Straining Fragility of Its Neighbors*. Update on 2 February 2026.

Al-Taher, R. H., Abuarab, M. E., Ahmed, A. S., Helalia, S. A., Hammad, E. A. and Mokhtar, A (2025) "Optimizing cotton green water footprint prediction using hybrid machine learning algorithms: a case study of Al-Gezira state, Sudan", *Applied Water Science*, 15(304).

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) – Sudan. Accessed on 15 December 2025.

CMI (Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation) (2025) *Youth-Led Mobilisation in Sudan: Resistance, Humanitarian Response & the Future of Peacemaking*. Policy Brief, December 2025.

Damrad, K. (2015) 'Quantifying the impacts of large-scale irrigation on rainfall', *MIT News*, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) (2025) *Sudan User Satisfaction Survey Report 2025*. Survey period: 21 October to 11 November 2025.

Fajinmi, G. (2025) *Cash Grant Assistance and Agricultural Productivity: Long-Term Effects on Rural Livelihoods*. July 2025.

Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) (2025) *East Africa Seasonal Monitor*. November 2025.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2022) *Special Report: 2021 FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Sudan*. March 2022.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2025a) *The Sudan – Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025*. January–December 2025.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2025b) *Employment and self-employment through agriculture and livelihoods support for vulnerable populations*. Aj Jazirah State Project Brief.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2025c) *Sudan – Aj Jazirah: DIEM-Monitoring emergency agriculture support brief*. October 2025.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2025d) *Gezira Scheme's Major Canal Visual Assessment*. April 2025.

Gender in Humanitarian Action (GiHA) Working Group (2025) *Sudan – Key Gender Findings from MSNA Female-Headed Households (FHHs)*. December 2025.

Hussein, M. A. and Ali, M. (2025) "Sudan has vast oil, gold and agricultural resources. Who controls them?" *Al Jazeera*, November 2025.

Insecurity Insight (2025) *Shattered Stalls, Shattered Lives: The Human Cost of Bombing Marketplaces*. November 2025.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) (2025a) *Famine Review Committee: Sudan, October 2025*. November 2025.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) (2025b) *Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity – September 2025 - May 2026 Special Snapshot*. 3 November 2025.

International Medical Corps (IMC) (2025) *Sudan Conflict Situation Report #27*. December 2025.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2025) *Cross-border monitoring report Sudan (1)*. Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 7 December 2025.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2026) *Sudan Displacement and Return Overview (2)*. Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 5 March 2026.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) (2025) *Watchlist 2026*.

Kirui, O. K., Ahmed, M., Siddig, K., Taffesse, A. S., Abushama, H. and Dorosh, P. (2024) "Livelihoods in Sudan Amid Armed Conflict: Evidence from a National Rural Household Survey." IFPRI/UNDP Joint Assessment.

Lighthouse Reports (2025) *The Kanabi Killings*. 16 December 2025.

Makawi, R. (2021) "The 'Real Politics' of Taxation in Post-Revolutionary Sudan". *African Arguments*, January 2021.

Nashed, M. (2025) "Sudan's competing authorities are beholden to militia leaders, say analysts", *Al Jazeera Features*, July 2025.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2025a) *Sudan Situation Weekly Update Mapping*, 01 Dec 2025.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2025b) *Sudan: A War of Atrocities*. Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan. September 2025.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2025c) *Human Rights Situation in the Sudan 1 January to 30 June 2025*.

Protection Cluster Sudan (2023) Protection Hotspots and Conflict Events As of 08 May 2023.

Rafiei, R., Huang, K. and Verma, M. (2022) "Cash versus in-kind transfer programs in humanitarian operations: An optimization program and a case study", *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, 82(A) 101224.

Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH) (2025) *Harvest of Despair: War and the Unraveling of Sudan's Food Security*. July 2025.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (2025) *Explosive Hazard Flash Update – Aj Jazirah State*. January 2025.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2025) *Sudan: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025 - Executive Summary*. May 2025 Addendum.

Wahlstedt, E. and Sulieman, H. M. (2025) *Supporting conflict-resilient food systems in Sudan*. Conflict Sensitivity Facility (CSF) Research.

World Food Programme (WFP) (2025) *Sudan Market Monitor – November 2025*.

World Bank (2024) 'Cash or In-Kind Transfers: Do Outcomes Vary According to Transfer Modality?', *Social Protection & Jobs Policy & Technical Note* (32), March 2024.

CONTACT

HUSSAM HANAFI
Lead Crisis Analyst
hhanafi@mercycorps.org

MIJI PARK
Country Director, Sudan
mpark@mercycorps.org

About Mercy Corps
Mercy Corps is a leading global organization powered by the belief that a better world is possible. In disaster, in hardship, in more than 40 countries around the world, we partner to put bold solutions into action — helping people triumph over adversity and build stronger communities from within.
Now, and for the future.

MERCY CORPS

45 SW Ankeny Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
888.842.0842

mercycorps.org