



ASSESSING THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO CHRONIC CRISIS IN NORTH KIVU

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The population of North Kivu Province in DRC has been facing protracted conflict for decades. Despite the succession of different political regimes, massive investments in peace and stability initiatives, and a large-scale humanitarian response, the province remains in a situation of chronic crisis. Forced and prolonged displacements are commonplace, inter-community tensions remain high, most of the population sits well below the poverty line, and the capacity of affected populations to cope with repeated shocks is eroding. **Why do all these issues persist? What could the international community do better to address these challenges and help improve the lives of those affected?** The primary objective of this case study is to start addressing these questions. It takes stock of the limited impact the assistance provided in North Kivu (specifically the Kitchanga-Goma-Rutshuru axis) seems to be having on mitigating overall vulnerability. It identifies gaps in knowledge and resources which may prevent the design and implementation of adequate and efficient responses. Based on an exploratory qualitative methodology, it does not seek to provide answers to all questions, but rather to launch a discussion among interested stakeholders.

The findings are presented in three main sections. The first section presents an analysis of the context, whereby **conflict in North Kivu is characterized by the existence of a market of violence**, a system where appropriation and allocation of goods is regulated by violence, and

in which violence itself becomes a valuable resource. Conflicted access to land and resources, identity issues, and a weak state are the principal characteristics of this market of violence, which creates vicious circles of conflict, resulting in massive violence, impoverishment and large-scale and prolonged displacements. Aid can contribute to breaking these vicious circles if the overall picture and underlying factors are well analyzed.

The second section of the report describes the significant population movements that are a result of protracted conflict. **Insecurity and fear of insecurity are key drivers of displacement. Movements towards towns, which are perceived as safe heavens, are a major trend.** These numerous arrivals have not however been met by urban planning or assistance to hosts who have been sharing their limited resources with IDPs. In fact, various waves of displacement have drained the capacities of local hosts to support IDPs, and as hosts become impoverished, overall vulnerabilities increase. In this context, the humanitarian community has defined vulnerability criteria which mainly targets IDPs only, and this leaves host communities, also affected by conflict and displacement, feeling increasingly deprived. This has created frustrations towards the international community as well as stoked inter-community tensions.

The third section explores the options and possible decisions made by affected populations faced with repeated shocks and chronic stresses. These coping mechanisms range from becoming

an actor of violence to keeping a low profile to relying on solidarity systems, and affected persons may live in IDP camps or maintain multiple residencies. In most cases, several mechanisms are combined. The report identifies some push and pull factors, as well as the main strengths and weaknesses of each option. **It highlights the adaptability and flexibility of affected populations in adopting resilience mechanisms.** Over time, displacements have led to the disruption of traditional livelihoods (such as subsistence agriculture), which in turn has been met by the adoption of innovative livelihood strategies. **Mobility, including commuting approaches between urban and rural areas, has been turned into an added value.** As a consequence, it is essential for any assistance in North Kivu to define the concept of durable solutions for affected populations in line with existing positive and innovative resilience mechanisms.

The report concludes that **humanitarian assistance in North Kivu remains essential to respond to punctual crises** – related to conflict, epidemics, malnutrition and natural disasters – that regularly create and/or worsen acute needs. At the same time, the report argues that many actors who carry out humanitarian work should **consider moving to longer-term approaches**

in order to address the causes of the chronic crisis in the province.

The recommendations of this report include:

1. Increasing integration of conflict sensitivity approaches in all humanitarian and development programming through evidence-based research, better stakeholder analysis, advocacy for appropriate reforms in DRC (notably land reform), and high standards of accountability for all actors including the DRC Government;
2. Revising targeting approaches in order to ensure humanitarian action systematically distinguishes between chronic and acute needs, mainstreams resilience strategies and engages relief, recovery and development actors at appropriate times;
3. Creating pull factors outside of the IDP camps through prioritizing historical areas of displacement (mostly urban and peri-urban areas) and assisting the entire affected population in building its capacity to withstand shocks and absorb massive displacements;
4. Supporting new patterns of residency and livelihoods that transcend the traditional urban/rural divide and create opportunities for economic development and stronger social cohesion.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</i>)
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People (<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i>)
CNR	Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>)
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (<i>Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda</i>)
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
M23	Movement of 23 rd of March (<i>Mouvement du 23 mars</i>)
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in DRC (<i>Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies en RDC</i>)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization's Stabilization Mission in DRC (<i>Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RDC</i>)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy (<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>)
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (<i>Violences Sexuelles et Basées sur le Genre</i>)
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Local terms are used according to the national Congolese spelling. Swahili is one of the official languages in DRC, nevertheless, the spelling in DRC is far from uniform.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This report was only possible thanks to the help of numerous persons. Thanks go first of all to the individuals and institutions in DRC, without whom this work would have not been feasible. Thanks go secondly to the research team: Louis de Gonzague Muhawe Ruganzu, Denise Katungu Muvunga, Denise Mbuluke Kasika, Josaphat Musamba Bussy, Claudine Nzigire Munamire, Vincent Rouget, Emmanuel Ruhune Kahasha. The research has furthermore greatly benefitted from the support of Solenne Delga (Mercy Corps), Nicolas Coutin (World Vision International), and Charles Holmquist (Search for Common Ground) in the design of the case study and the review of the report.



1

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTEXT

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The North Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a complex environment, comprised of a broad diversity of actors and influences, and a history intertwined with those of neighboring countries. The situation in North Kivu has been characterized for decades by the presence of dozens of armed groups (ranging from self-protection community militias, organized-crime/bandits to large-scale armies with political aspirations), complex regional relationships, and limited state function. Civilians experience recurrent and chronic human rights abuses, multiple forced displacements, impoverishment, and increased vulnerability. Over the years the civilian population has reacted to such recurring shocks with diverse survival strategies, including displacement, diversification of livelihoods, and maintaining a low economic profile.

Table 1: Background of the conflict in North Kivu

Background of the conflict in North Kivu [Stearns, 2008]

“Since the colonial era, communal strife has been at the heart of the violence. In particular this has been between Hutu and Tutsi, perceived as foreigners or immigrants, and those who describe themselves as indigenous. This conflict has its roots in the Belgian colonial administration, which promoted the mass immigration of Rwandans and manipulated ethnic power structures. But social realities have evolved during the half-century of independence. Whereas violence was largely rooted in local rural dynamics in the 1960s, by the next major violent episode in the 1990s, disputes over identity were linked into national and regional politics. Politicians based in Kinshasa and Goma fomented ethnic sentiment in the run-up to elections and both sides in the Rwandan civil war reached across the border to recruit in North Kivu.

By 2004, it was Rwandan security officials, local politicians, and Congolese army officers who called the shots within many, if not all, of the various armed groups. For local strongmen, armed mobilization along ethnic lines has become an essential part of their political strategy, to protect their assets and bolster their importance.

In order to understand this evolution, and to see the conflict from the point of view of its protagonists, it is inappropriate to remain fixated on late-twentieth century events. Local actors have grown up with memories of violence and prejudice that reach back generations and shape their actions today; conversations with or about armed groups in the region often begin with history lessons. This does not mean that these communities are trapped by their past, nor that historical grievances are more important than current interests. But history provides more than just the backdrop to the creation of armed groups: it allows us to disentangle their legitimate grievances from their more self-interested motives. It also gives some perspective, to take a step back and look at the larger structural forces underlying the violence in the region.”

Considering the history of North Kivu province, it is important to bear in mind two points: (i) the roots of the current conflict stretch beyond the last two decades; and (ii) interrelated internal and external causes are the outcomes of historical events [Autesserre, 2008]. Violent exploitation of the region has a tradition going back to the time of King Leopold's Congo Free State in the 19th century. Elites have fostered and exploited ethnic antagonism since colonial times [Turner, 2006], and Congolese leaders' policy to divide and conquer has continuously emphasized division. Mobutu's rule coined the term kleptocracy, establishing an economic system based on the withdrawal of a maximum of resources from a territory in exchange for minimal investments. If the Congolese State is today described as a predator, this can therefore be directly attributed to these historical precedents [Clark, 2002; Hochschild, 2011; Prunier, 2008; Stearns, 2011].

Repeatedly victim of predatory practices over the past century, the local civilian population of Eastern Congo has become trapped in a state of chronic and widespread insecurity and recurrent hostilities [Achvarina & Reich, 2006]. North and South Kivu frequently make headlines for human rights abuses connected to insecurity, including child recruitment in armed groups, systematic rapes, ethnic killings, massacres of civilians, mutilations, forced displacement and other forms of coercion and deprivation. The level of violence is terrifying and unrelenting. Civilians are trapped between multiple front lines, experience repeated displacement, and have nowhere to hide and few options for survival [Badenoch, 2014]. The level of violence in North Kivu has been documented by various protection agencies and explains why massive displacement is used as a protection mechanism. In North Kivu Province, the total number of IDPs reached one million people in August 2013 [OCHA, 2013]. According to IDMC approximately 23% live in camps and 77% reside in host families [IDMC, 2014].

Humanitarian aid has been delivered in the DRC on a massive scale since 1994, but the international community continues to face difficulties in responding to a complex and changing environment to protect civilians and deliver appropriate humanitarian relief and recovery interventions. The crisis persists and shows little to no signs of abating, and repeated shocks and ongoing armed conflict have resulted in the perception of the constant deterioration of the security situation. This has led some humanitarian organizations adhering to strict security rules to limit their movement, therefore reducing the reach of humanitarian organizations and their ability to protect civilian population by their presence [Mahony, 2013]. In the meantime, displaced populations have concentrated in and around urban areas perceived as safe havens. Humanitarian response to displacement into urban areas is however still rare.

2

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

Summary of research questions

Is the humanitarian community's response to the protracted conflict in North Kivu appropriate in light of the historical and structural context outlined above? Are targeting approaches, exit strategies and long-term solutions adequate? There is little understanding of the effects of humanitarian assistance on chronically vulnerable populations, especially with regards to hazardous pull factors and disruption of local coping mechanisms. According to UNHCR the "...phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees residing with host families is still relatively unexplored in comparison to what is known about IDPs and refugees living in camps" [Davies, 2012]. While the scope of research to address this gap in knowledge is extremely vast, this case study provides some insight and food for thought in relation to the following questions:

- *Displacement*: How do they cope after displacement? Do they adapt to the new environment? When do the IDPs return permanently, if they return at all? Do they commute? Which differences between camp residents and IDPs in host communities can be observed? It is in due consideration of the larger context that these questions and the dynamics of integration and exclusion are analyzed.
- *Vulnerabilities*: how do the affected populations perceive their own vulnerabilities at individual and community levels? What factors do they consider to be the main causes of their vulnerabilities and to have the greatest impact on their well-being?
- *Humanitarian response*: is the conceptualization of vulnerabilities and the way humanitarian programming is designed and implemented today relevant to the needs of the populations affected by protracted conflict and subsequent displacements, or does providing aid to such displaced people condone and prolong their displacement? It remains, for example, questionable whether longer-term solutions, protection and resilience in a protracted displacement situation can be better achieved in camps, collective sites or in host communities.

Push factor: element that is perceived positively and influences or motivates a decision.

Pull factor: element that is perceived negatively and discourages the adoption of an option.

To make comparative analysis possible, the research focused on differentiating the following dimensions: host vs. IDPs, rural vs. urban, and humanitarian assistance vs. absence of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, special attention is paid to the following crosscutting issues: (i) barriers and opportunities for mitigating vulnerabilities, (ii) successes and failures of humanitarian interventions, (iii) Do No Harm and peacebuilding, and (iv) protection (child, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and physical security). Considering these different aspects allows identifying structures, models, and mechanisms that either pose obstacles or

present opportunities for humanitarian interventions or community development (facilitated by external assistance).

The findings of this report are presented in three sections: i) an analysis of conflict dynamics in North Kivu; ii) an overview of displacement and vulnerability in such a context; and iii) the strategies employed by people faced with this situation.

A detailed description of the case study methodology can be found in Appendix A to this report.

Figure 1: Geographical areas assessed during the case study



original map from UNOCHA - Modified by Mercy Corps

3

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

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3.1 Protracted Conflict: Markets of Violence and Access to Land

Before studying issues of displacement, vulnerability and humanitarian response, one must understand the conflict context that led to the initial displacements. This opening section therefore presents an overview of that context. The structural elements of the current context are analyzed in light of the market of violence model.

Interests and reactions in conflict

Market of violence: refers to a system where appropriation and allocation of goods is ruled by violence, and in which violence itself becomes a valuable resource.

Conflict theorists argue that in a conflict, actors tend to act rationally. They would not survive in a market of violence if they could not manage resources – such as arms, soldiers, and fear – in a profitable way [Elwert, 1999]. Accordingly, this also means that for violent actors the market of violence is a condition for their survival. These actors therefore have an interest in impeding peace

initiatives, and preventing the rise of strong legal institutions and the rule of law. Youth are particularly inclined to join or support armed groups because of a lack of access to income generating activities. They enter a vicious circle that is extremely difficult to break, even through extensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. According to a recent paper on Congolese armed groups published by the Rift Valley Institute and the Usalama Project, in some areas: *“a large number of current rebel fighters have been through demobilization programmes, only to be re-recruited by rebel groups. Many found no alternative livelihood. Their former leaders pressured them to re-join, or they were prompted to do so by continuing insecurity in their home areas;”* [IRIN, 2014]

The market of violence has devastating consequences on a local population that has become trapped in a situation of poverty, insecurity and displacement. In order to survive in such a dangerous context, civilians often feel a need to seek protection from violent actors, by forming militias themselves, therefore creating a vicious circle of conflict, as represented in the diagram opposite.




Figure 2: Vicious circle of conflict

In this state of insecurity and contested authority, individuals seek protection from within their own ethnic group, and ethnic groups feel a need to rely on self-defense militias for protection. The market of violence is structurally related to the historic roots of ethnic tensions and the current framework of political economy: (i) the authority of the Government and customary leaders to allocate land titles is contested; (ii) a weak jurisdiction cannot resolve disputes that arise from parallel systems; (iii) violent means, in contrast, enable actors to pursue their interests successfully. Community leaders are both producing this system and a product of it. They tend to find their voice in the defense of community interests and land rights, and often form close links to armed groups. As time goes by, political success of these leaders comes to depend on making sure that these causes remain at the forefront of people's concerns, even if this can be destructive for the population.

In this regard, protracted conflicts are more complicated to deal with than contained conflicts – harm is multiplied and effects are enduring. Although this description cannot be uniformly ascribed to all actors or local communities, this is the prevailing trend in North Kivu province.

Access to land and other resources at the center of the conflict

This study is based on compelling evidence that the central feature of the conflict in North Kivu is a dispute over land and control of resources. These range from disputes between communities or armed groups over fertile or mineral-rich areas, to disputes between neighboring individuals over the boundaries that separate their farms or homes. These disputes can trace their origins to the policies of the Belgian colonial system and the subsequent Mobutu regime. The former facilitated the original mass migration of people from neighboring Rwanda into present-day DRC, and the latter exploited the new arrivals, by, at various times, either granting them favor or by treating them as scapegoats [Stearns, 2012]. Also, the responsibility to allocate land shifted from customary to state authorities, but in some cases the transition remained incomplete and led to the creation of parallel authorities. Following the collapse of the Mobutu regime and the start of the current protracted conflict, disputes over land primarily revolved around competing parties claims that their ownership of land is legitimate. They would often accuse their counterpart of having obtained the land through coercion or injustice. Nevertheless, the question of whether land transactions are forced, coerced or a product of mutual agreement matters little in the light of the present balance of power and perceptions. Today's disputes are resolved mostly by violent, extra juridical means. Power and resources are therefore accumulated according to the rules of the market of violence.

Part of the tension notably occurs because of a lack of clarity over the mandates of customary and state authorities, as mentioned above. Customary authority has a stronger local presence and it holds a longstanding role in allocating land among a community. However, starting in the colonial era state authorities obtained the right to distribute land, and their decisions sometimes contradict those of customary authorities. Furthermore Mobutu allocated land to his entourage to buy or reward loyalty, as a part of a policy called *Zairianization*. This created a group of wealthy landowners who primarily live in Kinshasa or abroad. They are often part of the political elite and manage to maintain their claim on the land.

Due to demographic pressure combined with a scarcity of land (observed in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories) these landowners are able to extract large profit margins by renting out their land. While the state holds a stronger position at the macro-level, they are much less present in rural areas and therefore their ability to enforce their decisions is not guaranteed. In these areas, customary authorities maintain their power to allocate land and sometimes take decisions that contradict those of the state or wealthy landowners.

Herders vs. farmers: an example of rising land conflict

One of the primary manifestations of the land conflicts described above is the tension that exists between herders and farmers. When in former times, for example in Sake, cattle would destroy fields, people usually found a compromise whereby the livestock keeper would compensate the damages. People also made deals to share the land: livestock herders would work on the plantation for two or three days and then work the rest of the time in pastures given to them in return. Such deals still exist and thus plantations still exist as well, for example in Lutoboko.¹ But in many cases plantations have been turned into pastures only. This is linked to the rise of “*patrons*”² (*bosses*), wealthy livestock owners who obtained the necessary papers from the authorities in Goma to drive the original population off the land and give it to herders. Several respondents indicated that the families that originally lived on plantations were chased away and lost their livelihood. For

instance, these days the Masisi region along the road to Kitchanga is a mostly cattle grazing territory, which it was not before. Kitchanga is said to be ‘beleaguered by pastures’ – with cattle grazing on all sides of town. The population has less access to land, and most of the ethnic tensions in the area are due



to this uneven access to land. Given the current land occupation, one assumption related to a vicious circle may be that deprivation of land by the “*patrons*” (largely Tutsis) who are eager to gain political and economic power and consolidate their power through attributing rewards along ethnic lines may fuel an anti-Tutsi sentiment. This in turn leads these individuals and potentially the Tutsi community to organize themselves in armed groups in order to protect their capital and ensure their physical security.

These changes in access to land, whereby violence and new balances of power regulate property as well as economic activities and dispossession prevail, have exacerbated the process of land flight and urbanization. In urban centers, one can now find farmers who were the first to be driven off their land, as well as the herders that had chased the farmers and were then chased themselves by the patrons. Urban centers are encircled by pastures that belong to *patrons*. As a result, access to land is limited, and herders, farmers, and

¹ The plantation owner said that contrary to former times the workers had to commute to Sake town more often to find paid work as the plantation produces less and as the workers had lost their livestock.

² One of the recommendations of this report is to conduct a comprehensive mapping of the actors in the conflict, in collaboration with the local organizations who are an important source of information. The “*patrons*” are key actors that would be studied in more details if such a mapping is undertaken.

the urban population alike are dependent on food provisions, because the soil for cultivation is mostly used for cattle which in turn are not meant to feed the local population. In sum, it does not seem to make a big difference whether the population is displaced by the *patrons*, warlords, or armed groups. The bottom line is that they have been driven off scarce land and lack land for cultivation, which represents a major obstacle to their return and therefore prolong their displacement.

The role that aid plays: Do No Harm considerations

Mary Anderson, in her publication “Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War”, pointed out that international assistance given in the context of war has an impact on the situation of which it is a part. Rather than being nonaligned, assistance can reinforce, prolong, or heighten tensions – or it can capacitate peaceful actors, even end a conflict. In sum, aid and conflict interact [Anderson, 1999].

“In the mid-1990s, North Kivu province experienced a paradigm case of aid exacerbating conflict. For instance, in the Masisi territory, aid helped building up the cattle industry, controlled by elites (reportedly Rwandophone) who developed huge ranches through means varying from purchase to forced displacement. This process was directly supported by international aid, and greatly contributed to the ‘inter-ethnic war’ in the Masisi in 1993” [Jackson, 2009].

As this example of program exacerbating tensions between herders and farmers shows, a detailed knowledge of the history and functioning of different systems (i.e. customary versus state laws, networks) should be a prerequisite to avoid doing harm. It is not easy to analyze how these factors overlap, condition, or influence each other. Many respondents in Masisi, Kitchanga, and Sake reported having been chased from plantations. In these towns dislocated people remained without land: Tutsi “patrons” control the land outside of the town, fostering the anti-Tutsi sentiment. Hence, all Tutsis are not welcome by the local population in the town center. “The land here belongs to Tutsis. They have all necessary papers. Tutsis are not tolerated in the center [Sake Town]. But their land surrounding Sake [owned by Tutsi “patrons”] cannot be touched. It is protected by the Government” (Sake 1.3.). If Tutsi patrons convert plantations into pastures, they need herders to look after the cattle – hence mostly Tutsi (traditionally herders) profit, while Hutu and Hunde farmers lose jobs on the plantations and farmland. The resulting antagonism between those vocational groups (herders and farmers), has become equated with ethnic groups, and is allegedly helping to fill up the ranks of militias today.

Lack of context analysis and weak Do No Harm approaches can therefore result in the need for humanitarian aid to provide assistance in the face of land mismanagement. Indeed, both farmers and herders now depend on food distributions or imports because they can no longer access farmland and produce their own food. However, it was not possible through this research to establish whether humanitarian aid is throwing a spanner in the works of the market of violence or greasing the gears. No points of friction between humanitarian assistance and structures that uphold the status quo could be found. This implies that the current form of assistance does not exacerbate the major factors contributing to insecurity and conflict. However, nor does it do enough to address the root causes of conflict, and is therefore missing an opportunity to contribute to peacebuilding.

Table 2: Section 1 key findings and recommendations

KEY FINDINGS

- The root causes of conflict are disputes over land and identity, and have been exacerbated by failed leadership and governance that ended up in chronic insecurity.
- Different actors adapt to the conflict in a way that deliberately or inadvertently feeds into that very same conflict. Actors' interests, perceptions of risk and the balance of power related to political or military means determine the way they adjust to the conflict.
- More needs to be done to study how the interventions of the international community have affected the conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Conduct an up-to-date key stakeholder analysis of different actors in and around the conflict in order to understand the dynamics of conflict and ensure that the design of programs is conflict sensitive. Due to the sensitive nature of such an analysis, issues of confidentiality will have to be considered.
- Ensure the findings of research on land, identity power conflicts and governance are shared widely to produce concrete recommendations to be implemented by the Congolese government with support from the international community. Thereafter, international organizations should advocate for land reform to lay the groundwork for sustainable peace building.
- To address the root causes of conflict, bottom-up mediation and reconciliation initiatives should be prioritized and initiatives that promote the rule of law should be encouraged.
- Ensure humanitarian and development interventions are designed in due consideration of the market of violence in order to be able to assess positive and negative impacts of aid at a macro-level, and systematically include objectives that address the root causes of conflict.

3.2 Aftermath of Protracted Conflict

Population movement trends

The pattern of displacement is very much linked to the reason for fleeing, that is to say generalized insecurity. In North Kivu province, displacements may be either preventative or reactive to a particular event or prevailing situation. Some displacements may be induced by military operations or heavy fighting between armed groups. They can also be induced by fear of persecution with regards to the predatory behavior of active players in the market of violence such as armed groups or legal forces who commit all kinds of human rights violations such as sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and killings, forced recruitment, forced labor, looting, illegal taxes, etc. Physical violence, coercion and deprivation have been widely reported by protection agencies for years. “FARDC troops (...) prohibited people from accessing their lands ‘to avoid civilians being mistaken for rebels’. Meanwhile, FARDC troops and their wives would go to the fields to harvest the crops, selling them at the local markets. Or, as one female trader in Kalehe said: ‘During their patrols, they steal our phones and money’ [Van Damme, 2012]. Affected populations are traumatized as they repeatedly experience violence and multiple displacements which affect their mental capacities to cope and restart their lives. The protracted and repeated displacement coupled with diminishing resources put communities under pressure and generate negative perceptions and resentment between groups, thereby negatively affecting peaceful cohabitation.

Disputes over land and resources have constituted a major factor for land flight and displacement towards urban settings. Land dispute has had different consequences on affected populations: (i) heightened ethnic tensions and armed group activities have dramatically increased insecurity, and (ii) diminished access to land has significantly lowered income opportunity for herders and farmers. These two main factors have accelerated urban displacement for two main reasons: (i) affected populations look for alternative income opportunities in towns, and (ii) affected populations have mitigated risks to their physical integrity by moving to the more secure environment that urban settings offer.

For instance, the population of Goma is estimated to have increased by 45% from 2012 to 2014 [IDMC, 2014]. Massive displacements are believed to highly contribute to this phenomenon.³ Prior to this study, Birere was believed to be a neighborhood that was largely untouched by consequences of displacement. There are no camps in or near Birere, which seems to be the reason why the impact of displacement was largely unnoticed by the international community. The number of IDPs is nevertheless extremely high. Eight out of ten inhabitants were reported to have migrated to Birere within the last two decades. In neighborhoods such as Ndosho or Mugunga the proportion of IDPs present is also high. These two neighborhoods were reportedly claimed from the forest during the last decade. The outskirts of present Goma are in areas that still figure on most maps as part of the national park. While Mugunga and Ndosho are situated next to camps on the outskirts of Goma, Birere is right in the center of Goma. Nearly unanimously, local authorities in Birere (*chef de cellule, chef du quartier* etc.) estimated that 80% of the present

³ It is not established though to which extent this substantial growth is attributed to population movements on the one hand and to population growth (of about 2.8% annual rate in DRC since 2009, per World Bank data) on the other hand.



population had arrived in the last ten to twenty year.⁴ According to our observations, a large number of people in Birere indeed have experienced displacement.

As a consequence of this massive urban displacement, whole neighborhoods are reported to deteriorate as more people are cramped into less space. Lots are quartered and sold for a higher price, criminality rises and social cohesion diminishes. The development of infrastructure does not match the numbers of IDPs in hosting communities and the subsequent increase of people living in town. Other factors also play a role, such as the volcanic eruption in 2002 that had already considerably shaken the livelihoods of people in Goma, and recent combat in town, including the

presence of M23 in the city in 2012 and subsequent waves of displacement. If unassisted, the foreseeable urban growth risks leading to the development of slums and – due to lack of sanitation and hygiene – to epidemics.

Over the years IDPs camps have popped up on the outskirts of towns. Displacement is motivated by search for livelihood/income opportunities and security. Those IDPs have chosen to settle in camps due to different factors: (i) either they did not manage to settle in town in hosting arrangements, or (ii) they decided that camps were offering greater benefits (see section 3.3 “Option and decision for affected populations”). The dynamics related to the closing and opening of camps and the lack of a foresight concerning urbanization can cause harm: in Mugunga¹, IDPs and locals argue over the site of the camp, which was erected, destroyed, and reopened over the course of time. In the time when the camp was closed, people occupied the lots cleared from the forest previously by IDPs. When the camp re-opened, this land was no longer free but claimed by the local population. The camp was erected in the same site as before, but the dispute about these claims added to the tensions between locals and IDPs. The erection and destruction of a camp is intrinsically tied to the process (and the problems) of land flight and urbanization. This is also exemplified in the following example: When the camp in Sake was closed, many IDPs were reluctant to return and stayed in town instead. The presence of big plantations already made it difficult for locals to have access to land surrounding Sake and tensions between the local population and newcomers were high. When the camp closed, the competition and conflict over land further heightened the tensions. This should be a lesson learned. The case points at the **opportunity to prevent tensions by foreseeing and supporting the process of urbanization (through improving urban planning, developing access to services and resources taking into consideration large population growth, etc.) in case land issues cannot be solved in the short term.**

⁴ Due to the scale of our research we could neither investigate these questions further nor carry a census out.

Table 3: Race to the bottom: twelve years - five displacements

Race to the bottom: twelve years – five displacements

The case of Mathias¹, a displaced elderly man encountered in the camp of Kiwanja exemplifies vividly what it means to be trapped in a protracted conflict: twelve years ago he had to flee from his village *Binza* for the first time due to attacks by the FDLR. He managed to buy a house in the village of *Nyamirima* where he stayed with his family until the prevalent insecurity forced him to move on. He found a host family that put him up. When the CNDP launched its campaign in 2006 he was forced to flee to the camp *Nyakasesa*, where his hosts joined them a little bit later. The camp was no safe haven – they were soon after forced to leave due to increasing insecurity. He then managed to rent a house in *Busanza*. As his financial resources were drained and the insecurity increased in the area, he was obliged to finally go to the camp in *Kiwanja* where he now resides with his wife.

Mathias wonders how the government is able to declare that the conflict has ended, even though he sees the conflict every day. Of his 17 children, none of them has work, nor are they in school. “Those who have studied are discriminated and do not get a job. You know the resentments that grow in the heart of those children?” he asks. “That is the reason why you do not see the wars ending. Everybody wants to protect his ethnic group by creating a militia!” In the camp Mathias lives among people from villages where he stayed during his odyssey. Those who had been hosts became displaced themselves, as different waves of displacement brought them together in the camp. Solidarity was high in the beginning, yet after numerous displacements, IDPs and impoverished hosts of the surrounding town of Kiwanja are no longer on good terms. Tensions run high and many speak about another upcoming conflict “If they continue like this, they risk a war – between the locals and us”, Mathias concluded.

Affected populations exercise multiple displacements between urban and rural areas as both protective and resilience mechanisms. The length of the displacement in different locations varies depending on the level of risk in the area of origin, the level of assistance received in the place of displacement, the shocks that occur in the area of displacement, and the extent to which the displacement is part of a resilience strategy. Recurrent shocks occur because of the constant shift in control of areas, of changing alliances and power balance between predatory armed groups that act with fluctuating interests. In view of these conflict dynamics, it is worth mentioning that **North Kivu is less an emergency context per se than a chronic crisis fueled by a vicious circle ending up in recurring shocks and multiple displacements.**

IDPs say that they have managed to survive various displacements thanks to what they were able to bring along. Yet their situation deteriorates each time they are displaced. In addition, finding refuge from insecurity in town – the prevailing trend – presents additional challenges, as goods are typically five times more expensive in Goma than in rural areas. The cost of living forces IDPs to sell their land and engage in debt⁵; thus, the situation of IDPs may deteriorate even without further displacement.

The economic situation deteriorates for hosts and IDPs altogether, and options for refuge diminish with each displacement. “Before the conflict somebody with two or three cows and some poultry was considered

⁵ Marriage of girls under age has to be understood in this context, too. The dowry is an income, one mouth less is to be fed at home.

poor – nowadays he is considered a rich man,” (respondent in Burungu, interviewed March 2014). IDPs that manage to rent or find a place to stay in the urban area usually see their financial resources drained. “Since 1993 I have been in a situation of displacement and each time that I am displaced my situation gets worse”, an IDP in Ndoshu explained (interviewed February 2014). **Recurring shocks generate multiple displacements and/or additional factors of stress that impoverish IDPs and hinder potential for development. It results in keeping populations in a dramatic level of generalized poverty. This level of poverty, in turn, diminishes local capacities to host and integrate IDPs.**

The strengths and limits of solidarity systems in host communities

The population does not generally make the difference between IDPs based on the cause of their displacement (i.e. induced by conflict/insecurity or for economic reasons). The often-heard argument is that the fate of displacement could happen to anybody. In fact, nobody explicitly or implicitly blamed IDPs for their own impoverishment during the research. The level of solidarity encountered during field work on the contrary seemed exceptionally high: this represents a **significant social capital** in regard to local integration. The scale to which residents of Goma are affected by displacement shone through in a discussion with chiefs in Mugunga: each person present declared hosting various IDPs. Hosting is not limited to family members. Often church members, colleagues, or even total strangers also help. In many schools we heard from teachers who had been put up by a colleague. One had given a room to a co-worker from the nearby camp because the conditions there were not good: “Now he sleeps better” (Lac Vert 17.2.14),” he explained. Similarly, a building caretaker in Birere told us that he is hosting IDPs he found sleeping outside. Although he did not know them, and without being socially obliged (family ties, other networks) he gave seven persons shelter, simply saying “Come on, sleep here.” A local chief [Chef d’Avenue] confirmed: “the population tries its best to assure that the IDPs have a normal life, because no one can bear that his IDP neighbor passes the night with an empty stomach while he himself still has food at his place.” (Birere, 22.2.14).

Getting by with little – IDPs in host families

A woman’s account: I have lived off agricultural activities in Kiwanja. I rented a small lot, 13x13 meters for \$20 per season, and I sold the products. When I had a problem connected to the land, I went to the customary authorities and they sorted the problem out. All preceding armed conflicts I stayed, but due to the level of pillages, rapes and coerced recruitments committed by M23 I decided to leave. The widow of my maternal uncle put us up. She helped me and my eight children survive by brewing and selling alcoholic drinks. We lived in perfect harmony and shared everything. The good and the bad. Thanks to them I could nourish and dress my children. My husband nevertheless refused to live with his in-laws and now moved in with a friend in Bukavu, but he still rests unemployed and without an occupation. The space at the uncle’s house was not sufficient, my sister rented two rooms (each 2x2 square meter) and paid the first deposit for four months’ rent. There is no toilet attached to the rooms. That is why I maintain good relations with all my neighbors so that I can use their toilets. Our family now subsists thanks to the bag of manioc flour and the bag of charcoal I sell. My son helps with a little money he makes washing cars at the lake, and my daughter by dressing hair. (Birere 25.2.2014)

Table 4: Getting by with little - IDPs in host families

Hosts are chosen by (i) relation: close family, good friends, members of economic or social networks; (ii) location: access and proximity to the place of origin – to either be able to commute, or to be at a distance that is considered safe; (iii) possibilities to make a living in the new location. These are the crucial determinants for the choice on the side of the IDPs. In part the destination and the likelihood of successful integration into the new location are dependent on networks that were developed during past waves of displacement. Such networks generate integration opportunities: “IDPs in host families and communities usually find greater opportunities for work, business, food production, education and socialization, among other advantages, than those confined to camps”, according to a UNHCR study [Davies, 2012]. Our observations conform that those who stay with host families that are close kin are sometimes able to get training or education. Teachers reported that the hosts paid the school fees for those staying with them. IDPs in host communities are actively integrated into urban life by their hosts: brewing local drinks, fabricating planks, jars, baskets, guarding land, cattle, or houses for patrons are activities where hosts can help to establish the necessary contacts. In rural areas it is usually the host that gives land to farm, and a lot to build a house. On the side of the hosts the sense of solidarity, level of family obligation, quality of social ties, and material conditions determine the readiness to put IDPs up and the length of the stay. Social pressure is high. Direct requests of IDPs to be hosted should not be declined directly. After a while the guest is nevertheless supposed to move on if the conditions do not allow a prolonged stay.

Hosts have been impoverished, too. A family father who has to take care of IDPs is called a *Jua Kali* or *Muangasibi* [resourceful/someone who finds a way to get by] – an expression that stresses the level of poverty and struggle in such families. As the conflict continues, the possibilities to help diminish. “We share the little that we have”, is a recurrent expression used in this regard. We heard repeatedly that “even the “autochtones” have become displaced,” because they are as vulnerable as the displaced. In Kanyaruchinya all nearby wood reportedly has been cut for firewood, seeds have been eaten, and stores and granaries have been emptied. Even after the IDPs have returned to their home villages, resources of the hosts remain exhausted. Thus, IDPs who stay with hosts often share their fate with the family that puts them up – dragging both parties into precarious living conditions and heightening the overall level of poverty.

The study showed that the relation between IDPs and hosts is an ambiguous mix of generosity and hospitality on the one hand, and suspicion and exploitation (whereby for instance the IDPs are paid less than any other worker⁶) on the other hand. For example, not only armed groups, but also IDPs are suspected to loot the fields. A priest in Kanyaruchinya regretted to have hired IDPs to cultivate his land, because he believed they had stolen the harvest: “As they knew the fields, they must have been the ones,” (Interview February 2014). Additionally, there are stereotypes that IDPs are used to being helped by others instead of helping themselves (Lac Vert and Kiwanja being the most prominent examples). Cases of IDPs and host families that explicitly complained about being excluded from assistance despite being vulnerable suggest that jealousy and the conviction that IDPs in camps are fed by WFP lie at the basis of the decreasing solidarity. These cases were only encountered where hosts and IDPs staying outside camps had experienced exclusion (including at Kanyaruchina and Kitchanga).

⁶For instance, in the sand mine on the way to Bulengo camp, IDPs had replaced the original workers. They reported to earn very low wages – fifty per cent of what workers would usually get.

Overall, it was reported that where international organizations distinguish hosts from IDPs and only provide assistance to the latter instead of targeting the whole community, social cohesion is eroding. Other frustrations regarding the way assistance is provided were expressed: “If the kind of assistance provided for IDPs in the camp would exist for IDPs living in host families my life would not have crashed like this financially,” explained Mariam, a divorced woman that hosts her mother and niece that had to flee due to violence in Masisi in 2012 (Birere, February 2014). Two of her brothers found refuge in a camp – so now nobody looks after the fields, though farming activities previously had helped all members of the family. For Mariam this means that a significant source of income was lost and expenses are increasing. The consequence of having put up these two IDPs were that she lost her savings; that her family eats twice instead of three times a day; that they eat less and worse food; that she has problems to pay the school fees for her children; and that she has to borrow money from different neighbors and her business partners (she helps run a snack stand for extra income).

Likewise, it was expressed that the presence of displaced people in urban settings leads to a reduction in job opportunities, and in urban areas, access to jobs is as important as access to land in rural areas. The attempts by IDPs to enter the urban labor market at any price leads to a situation where one man’s win is another man’s loss. The new competitors sell “whatever, wherever, for any price” (Birere, February 2014). The president of the market of Kahembe complained that the pirate markets along the streets undermine the official ones, while unions lament that the wages are dropping overall. The agreements amongst porters cannot be upheld: porters in Birere said that they could not prevent the IDPs from undermining their prices, because, as they said, everybody has to make a living at the end of the day. “Before you would get a nice dish for 1000 Francs (approx. \$1), now you cannot find such dishes anymore, nowadays there are only plates for 300 (approx. \$0.30) sold. According to the demand for the Kilakas (detailers) - “it is better to sell 10 plates for 300 than 2 for 1000,” (Birere February 2014). Consequently, urban displacements have created a parallel informal economic system which undermines a more structured economy organized by unions and socio-professional groups. Taking stock of these new trends will be critical to preserve the existing economic and productive systems while promoting the dynamism of the urban labor market and the identification of new opportunities.

In sum, **solidarity systems towards displaced population in North Kivu are very developed, widely used and highly valuable for IDPs in search for social networks and economic opportunities.** These systems have nonetheless been overstretched by multiple waves of displacement, and are currently eroding in a context of generalized poverty. The frustrations expressed by host communities, specifically towards the way assistance is provided, have to be taken into consideration by the international community in order to protect this strong social capital and mitigate conflicts amongst affected populations. In the end, most IDPs were found to be marginalized and discriminated against, and there is evidence to show that the current policy of giving support to persons registered in camps or on vulnerability list is impeding social inclusion both during and after displacement.

Poverty and perception of vulnerability

Most IDPs and affected populations are targeted by the international community to receive assistance on the basis of vulnerability criteria. However, targeting criteria applied to identify beneficiaries of assistance is perceived as a deprivation for those who are not considered. Thus providing assistance to a part of the population creates various tensions. Interviewees complained about the fact that food is given out only to IDPs or only to IDPs living in camps, or only to those who had been previously been registered on lists. The phrase “We are all vulnerable” was heard repeatedly during the research. Locals from Kanyaruchinya complained that, “the impact

displacement is having for the host communities is not acknowledged – the help is only directed towards the IDPs” (Interview, February 2014). *Vulnerabilité* [vulnerability] is a loan word in Swahili⁷; the term obviously has a special quality, but it cannot be directly translated into the local language. This does not mean that locals are not able to give a definition of vulnerability. The term *vulnerabilité* is used (in Swahili and French) whenever the speaker wants to refer to a criterion applied by international organizations that establishes a special status. The term is referring to the concept applied by NGOs to categorize the people qualified for aid resulting in a perception of discrimination. Sometimes this relation was even reversed: people were considered vulnerable because they were assisted – because they had been distinguished from the others by NGO action.

Vulnerability: Person in need of special care, support, or protection because of age, disability, or risk of abuse or neglect (Oxford Dictionary).

In the context of North Kivu, the population seems to resist a definition of vulnerability based on status, and instead define “vulnerability” as relative, namely depending on the self and/or external perception of capacity to provide for oneself.



⁷ A variety of Swahili words were used during the case study to express ‘vulnerability’. There is no exact translation for vulnerability in Swahili. The aspect of security and poverty cannot be expressed in a single term. “Umaskini” means a lack of something, above all lack of material things. The expression is usually used for poverty. “Ulenimaskini” means “to be poor”. The expression “Umaskiniwausalama” [lack of security] does not exist. Yet the superlative “Ukosefu”, which means greatest lack of something, can be used to circumscribe a lack of security: “ukosefuwausalama” = “lack of security”.

Yet in regard to assistance all believe they are eligible; hosts, displaced, and returnees unanimously criticized the discriminatory policy of NGOs. The argument is that a) such a differentiation is unfair, because everybody is suffering – and that b) the cohesion of the community and the sense of solidarity diminish due to this approach (as reported by respondents in Kibati, February 2014). The involvement of the population in a vulnerability assessment in Kibati was unsuccessful: local criteria were established, households visited, persons listed – and then the list was changed again, and remained a matter of dispute and bitter arguments. Projects where help was directed to raped women, or widows, were labeled discriminatory for not integrating an adequate gender analysis. In Kahe, camp residents asked ironically after a bakery project for women, which seemed to have failed: “Now, what profit do they have? They even lost their own money,” (focus group in Kitchanga March 2014). The context in which such remarks were made gave the general impression that complaints were based on a feeling that the respondent’s troubles were not recognized. In this regard the expression “we are all vulnerable” might indicate a perceived lack of recognition on the part of international agencies, a lack of appreciation of the difficulty and losses residents of host communities experience along with IDPs.

When applying more general vulnerability criteria (such as food security or Non-Food Items scores, coping mechanisms index, etc.) hosts often meet these, and it has been shown that assisting only displaced people in an already vulnerable situation creates tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. **The shock experienced by not receiving assistance is a material and moral one: the experienced hardship, the suffering, and the subjective feeling of being vulnerable are compounded by not being recognized as being vulnerable (and thus not receiving assistance).**

Poverty and vulnerability are not always equated. Virtually all persons interviewed unanimously agreed on the same signs of wealth and poverty: wealth is usually measured in livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, pork, poultry) – which is of no small significance in regard to dowry. Being able to pay for health care, having a job, paying school fees, having access to land, a house, being well dressed and tidy, eating well are factors characterizing a rich person. Poor people in contrast do not feature any of these characteristics. “You can tell who is poor by looking at them. They are dirty, wear *bambuches* [sandals] – their children do not have school supplies,” teachers in Mugunga explained. Discussing the situation of pupils coming from the nearby camp, another resident continued: “They sleep during class – and when you ask them ‘why do you sleep?’ They say ‘We have had another *nuit blanche* [sleepless night] because we had no food,” (Interviews conducted in Mugunga in February 2014). Another teacher specified poverty by adding: “You are what you eat, right?” While signs of wealth and poverty seem to be commonly understood, vulnerability remains more relative and dependent on perceptions and situations: “I was poor – because I had nothing when I returned here”, a priest from Burungu explained, “but **I was not vulnerable, because I was still strong. Someone who cannot help himself – this is a vulnerable person,**” he concluded (March 2014). Hosted IDPs are dependent on hosts’ livelihoods and hosts have to share their resources, which are often meager. In this situation, can one say that the IDP is more vulnerable than the host?

In sum, the specifications of vulnerabilities and opportunities vary between camp residents, IDPs in host families, and hosts. **Yet the levels of vulnerability do not depend on any of these situations, but on (perceived) capacities, access to resources and the quality of livelihood of each household.** Thus, an

approach that only considers levels of material wealth or status (displaced or not displaced) is suboptimal to identify and target vulnerabilities.

Table 5: Section 2 key findings and recommendations

KEY FINDINGS

- Disputes over land and identity have generated widespread insecurity that resulted in different patterns of displacement. Urban displacement and urbanization are growing because towns are considered to be a safe haven offering alternative livelihood opportunities.
- Multiple displacements are impoverishing both IDPs and host families. Resources and capacities of host families in urban settings are dramatically diminishing due the prolonged displacement.
- Affected populations deem to be discriminated against and deprived from the international aid/assistance. This leads to tensions within the community.
- Poverty is widespread and affected populations are experiencing similar difficulties regardless of their status.
- Affected populations do not consider being vulnerable as per the criteria applied by the international community. Vulnerability is related to their capacity to access resources and the quality of their livelihood.


RECOMMENDATIONS

- The government and the international community should develop new and innovative approaches to support the urbanization process (including hosting arrangements in urban settings) in order to ensure better living conditions and to mitigate tensions within the community.
- Displacement dynamics should be further analyzed and understood in order to determine a systemic approach to respond to population needs.
- The international community should revise its targeting criteria and further consider supporting areas of displacement through community-based and longer-term approaches instead of singling out individuals. They should not limit the response to a life-saving model but rather look at North Kivu as a chronic crisis that requires greater investment by development actors.

3.3 Options and Decisions for the Affected Population

How do conflict-affected populations cope with repeated shocks in a market of violence? What social changes, triggered by protracted conflict and multiple displacements, can be observed? There is no single model of successful resilience. This case study shows that the populations of North Kivu have adopted over time a variety of coping mechanisms, both negative and positive, to survive in a market of violence and to adapt to the drastic social and economic changes they are experiencing. The graphic below presents a schematic representation of resilience mechanisms that have been identified in North Kivu during the research.

Figure 3: Resilience mechanisms identified during the research



Keeping a low profile

Insecurity is no abstract likelihood – for the population of Eastern Congo, insecurity means firsthand experiences of abuse, rape, mutilation, and torture for persons of every age and gender. In the best-case scenario, preventive displacement makes it possible to diminish human and material losses. Yet many people go through the same traumatizing experiences over and over again: houses are burnt, livestock killed, harvest lost, stock looted, household items stolen; money and goods are given to armed groups in order to save lives or spare children from recruitment and in response to other extortions. Resources and



opportunities to re-establish livelihoods are diminishing after each incident. Seeds kept for the next season are eaten during moments of crisis, and fields are not cultivated due to insecurity. Charcoal cannot be produced and sold for extra cash due to insecurity in the forest. “Before the war we cultivated a hectare, now we don’t cultivate more than half. People ask themselves: ‘Why? There will be another war.’ If you produce more than you need,

people come and steal it. Profit attracts insecurity, so we just produce enough to survive” [Oxfam, 2012]. The continuous experience of expropriation and extortion has diminished the readiness to plan or work for the long-term and has led the affected population to hide their capital in order to avoid being exposed. Production in rural areas is often diminished to the minimum to avoid burglary and robbery.

Indeed, the variety of possible options to make a living within the current market of violence is limited. If violence, insecurity, extortions, burglary, robbery, and impunity prevail, most ways to earn an income appropriate in other contexts are blocked. In the current situation, becoming a violent entrepreneur is an extreme, but it is also a rational choice. On the other extreme, yet also rational, is the choice to opt for keeping a low profile and, for some individuals, self-impoveryishment⁸. Both strategies were identified in all surveyed areas. The concept of self-impoveryishment however needs to be further investigated. Since people hide their resources as a protection mechanism, it is hard to comprehend how resources are distributed and if people who *seem* poor actually *are* poor.

Strategies of (either apparent or actual) impoveryishment, in most cases in North Kivu, involve resilience. This means the shock is first absorbed, livelihoods restarted from scratch again – and a decision to farm less than before or keep a low profile in all aspects of life is taken after the minimal conditions for survival are re-established. The strategy of keeping a low profile is closely linked to issues of protection: for instance, a person feeling that s/he is exposed to looting, and all associated protection risks, because of its food stock may decide to produce less in order to mitigate those risks. Since this protection and risk mitigation strategy negatively affects food security and income generation, this person may compensate this loss by seeking humanitarian aid as a survival mechanism, and if not, may opt for self-impoveryishment to diminish the likelihood of being looted. Resilience mechanisms in North Kivu must be analyzed in light of the option people have or do not have to make choices. When does one have only one option to survive? When is one able to make choices and consider risk management and mitigation in selecting one or several coping mechanisms? What does this say about vulnerabilities in the province?

Resilience: the ability of individuals, communities and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty.

(OECD, 2013)

⁸ Self-impoveryishment refers to a strategy which consists in making oneself poor or intentionally staying poor in order to avoid harm related to wealth or achieve benefits related to poverty.

The option of IDP camps: pull and push factors

According to interviewed IDPs, most of those who go to camps have no other choice and consider this option to be the last resort. In the opinion of most people, including IDPs living with host families, the living conditions in camps are highly precarious. Yet there are clear benefits for inhabitants of camps, including water, health care, food provisions (though sometimes irregular), sometimes free school admission, and potentially return kits. Although the level of insecurity is high inside the camps, the residents believe that militias, soldiers, or police cannot come into the camps to persecute them. The camp residents are able to help people living outside the camps; e.g. declare children as theirs, give access to health care, share the food if provided.

Table 6: A story about a wheelchair and a sewing machine

A story about a wheelchair and a sewing machine

Hubert worked as a *chukudeur* transporting goods in his makeshift *chukudu* (sort of bicycle) before he lost a leg in the CNDP war. He fled from his hometown Kibati due to the arrival of M23. While his wife and children stay in Goma with a host family, he lives in camp Mugunga³. “According to my tradition I cannot go to stay at my brother’s place with my whole family. I avoid creating conflict or overburdening my brothers of the host family.” A porter with one leg does not get far, yet the only help Hubert got was \$10 a month sent from a maternal uncle living in Uganda. \$10 is not sufficient to feed a family, not to speak of financing a wheelchair to be able to be mobile again. Only international organizations would help. How to get in touch with an international organization? In a town of over a million inhabitants - in which nearly everybody searches assistance, how to get a hold of people that just drive by in their white Toyotas marked with UN, or NGO signs?

The president of the camp of Mugunga³ is originally from Kibumba, the village next to Hubert’s home village. “He could not leave me like that”, Hubert explained, “that is why he helps me here in the camp”. Life in the camp is not easy. Yet Hubert in the camp managed to get in touch with Handicap International– and he got a wheelchair. “Outside of the camp I could not have found it,” he asserts. Hubert now envisions himself starting tailoring [a common activity for handicapped persons in rural and urban areas]. Therefore he started taking classes, but he still needs a sewing machine.

Hubert’s child is sick. He is not happy to be living apart from his family. His uncle in Uganda has not sent any money for five months. No food has been distributed in the camps for the past three months. He depends on the charity of others to have 500 Francs (approx. \$0.55) a day. Yet he prefers to rest and wait: “If good-willed people would come to help me find a sewing-machine – it would be good.” (Mugunga, February 2014).

The relevance of camps for the resilience of IDPs also includes the infrastructure provided to the community. In an exemplary case, various NGOs were not only providing basic infrastructure for the population in Mweso and adjoining camps, but they were also giving employment to 80 persons. The

NGOs in other words were directly responsible for around eighty households – a minimum of 500 heads. The presence of a few NGOs thus created to some extent a rather peaceful island in the midst of a zone of insecurity by providing temporary infrastructures and jobs. This said, **in most situations, camps provide temporary assistance to address problems that require time to be resolved.** This is a strong indicator that link between humanitarian and development aid should be reinforced in order to develop sustainable exit options. For instance, the temporary shelter provided in the camp is prolonging the state of limbo that IDPs are in. Rather than generating durable and permanent solutions like adequate housing, poor shelter standards in camps have negative consequences on health, security, family stability, etc.

In general, the population strives to maximize profit margins established with the creation of camps. IDPs that are registered in camps and benefit from humanitarian assistance, hence, have an edge over others – e.g. by selling food provisions and return kits (approx. \$50). In the perspective of IDPs, humanitarian aid is a resource. Cases have been reported where people multiply their income options as IDPs by multiplying registrations. “They come here and collect ten kits, because they have registered nine ghosts ... and take the next motorcycle taxi for 2000 Francs (approx. \$2) to go back to Goma immediately,” (Kibumba, February 2014). Nonetheless, in a situation where IDPs have to start from scratch and cannot count on their hosts to support them, humanitarian assistance is a crucial advantage – even without any distortion. A Tutsi refugee explained, how he “fastened the belt tighter” to sell parts of the food rations given in the Rwandan camp. He formed an association together with other persons and thereby managed to reconstitute a herd, return to DRC and re-establish his livelihood. The bottom line is that this recovery was made possible by the unintended consequences of humanitarian assistance. In a situation where individuals have lost everything and have to start from scratch – or worse: often are in debt – such starting momentum makes the crucial difference.

However, during the period of research WFP had interrupted providing food to camp residents. This means that in all the camps that were visited residents had not received food for about three months. Thus, IDPs,

even those living in camps, have to cope without assistance. The IDPs face many obstacles trying to make a living: especially because in camps it is more difficult to find access to the formal job market. As IDPs in camps are perceived to be more vulnerable than the better-connected locals and IDPs in hosting arrangements, it is common to exploit workers from camps. They are not paid until they have finished their work, which means that they have to spend days without wages. (reported in Kiwanja and Mweso, March 2014). Even cases where “patrons” claim that they give IDPs land for free are



advantageous to the landowners: out of gratitude the farmers are expected to give a part of the harvest to the owners (5-10%). Furthermore, IDPs who are far away from the center have problems finding work – especially those living in the camp of Mugunga.

According to UNHCR and Oxfam, illicit activities have considerably grown in the camps – especially brewing and prostitution due to lack of assistance and access to income-generating activities. Women and girls – as well as men and boys to a lesser extent—who are raped are consequently discriminated against, often abandoned by their families, and have to bring up their children alone. This, in turn, leaves few other options than prostitution. Men were reported to travel to the camps from downtown Goma because prostitution there was unbeatably cheap. One girl from the camp declared to only live off such city men, and avoid customers from the camps “because they are all sick.” Transactional sex and sexual exploitation are not easily distinguishable in precarious conditions. Many coping mechanisms are therefore doomed to fail or have high negative effects, and only augment the vulnerability. There is no in-depth analysis of whether risks related to sexual violence are higher in or outside camps. However, statistics provided by UNICEF indicate that around 50% of victims of sexual violence are minors, which suggests a great risk for youth. According to UNFPA figures related to sexual violence in 2013, Rutshuru, Lubero and Masisi are territories with the highest prevalence of sexual violence and the main perpetrators are reported to be civilians, the FARDC and the FDLR. Both UNHCR and UNICEF suspect that the structural deficiency of the judicial system discourages victims to claim justice in court, ultimately fuelling impunity. As a consequence, human right abuses are becoming normalized and socialized.

The current form of camp management creates other unintended results, including hampering urban integration and/or return: the expectation to get assistance increases with each distribution one is excluded from – the invested time has to be compensated. Many people from Kibumba and Kibati who stayed in the camps were waiting for the return kits. They did not leave the camp, because they assumed they would have to be present in order to get the kit, though it was not clear then whether kits would be given out at all. Likewise, camp residents are anxious not to miss registration for vouchers if they leave the camps. Several camp residents reported that they would lose their tokens if they worked in the fields. If they search for work, work for host communities, travel to see family – they might lose the possibility to get the *carte du diable* (devil's cards is a nickname for registration tokens). Rumors abound, nothing is certain and this devilish token is hard to get – camp residents thus prefer to stay. Instead of supporting the reintegration in the labor market or into agriculture, IDPs are in this regard blocked by the desire to be assisted. Staying in camps, on top of blocking integration into the labor market, has become a new form of economic activity itself – efforts have to be invested and are to be rewarded. Just as in any other competition certain individuals perform better than others. Abuses of lists are numerous. Certain persons manage to live off of provisions and kits: ghost lists are often mentioned and various others strategies have been documented [Haver, 2008]. This can in turn oblige camp residents to stay in the camps and not seek opportunities elsewhere in case of identity verification.

“Tell the humanitarians that we do not want their beans, and their flour, and their corn, and their rice – this only created dependence. ... We have corn of good quality here. Help us with your expertise to manage ourselves, to produce more. Those who rest in the camps impoverish themselves to benefit...” (A government official in Kibumba, February 2014).

Furthermore, physical security (including child protection and prevention of GBV) is not guaranteed in camps, **and most respondents that we interviewed over the course of the study expressed fear of the camps.** The level of insecurity, criminality, prostitution, hostilities and exploitation certainly appears to be high in the camps. Camps are not located within MONUSCO protected areas, but outside the barbed wire: armed groups have repeatedly attacked camps in the past and such incidents still occur. In some cases though, specifically in urban areas, the camps can be seen as protected areas due to the presence of the MONUSCO or the FARDC in the surroundings.

Most humanitarian actors agree that the current situation in the camps is not optimal. A search for alternatives can only be started by examining the reasons for the continued presence of these camps in order to address root causes—The observed pull factors of camps were: (i) access to free and quality health care, (ii) access to clean and safe water, (iii) access to free education, (iv) access to resources linked to the IDP status (registration equals right to receive valuable material or non-material goods), and finally (v) contact with international organizations (see “a story about a wheelchair” above). The push factors mentioned the most often were lack of nutrition, shelter and economic opportunities. If the appalling conditions inside the camps are endured, this is a telling statement about the state, availability and quality of infrastructure outside the camps.

Finding multiple opportunities to adapt

Affected populations in North Kivu demonstrate high adaptation capacities in order to cope with shocks. When they can, they tend to combine several options and strategies to withstand repeated shocks and build their resilience in a durable manner.

Multiplying residencies: transcending the urban/rural divide

Firstly, they react to the impoverishment of their hosts, try not to exhaust their host's resources and therefore distribute family members into different households. An elderly man in Ndosho, for example, was hosting two elderly people at his house. They had to sleep in the same bed as his children, the lady with his daughters, the man with his sons. He did not have enough space and they were not comfortable, but as they were from his village he felt obliged. The man and the woman were not related and both came without their children who had found refuge in different places. In this case and in many others, families often prefer to split up to avoid straining the host too much. Women and children are more easily incorporated into a host family than men. In the light of their traditional role as breadwinners, men face more problems to integrate into another household – and to collaborate with the family father in charge there – than women and children. A disabled man in Mugunga 3 explained this to be the principal reason why he preferred to stay in the camp.

Another way of coping with displacement has been to adapt to major economic trends linked to the protracted conflict that transcend traditional patterns of settlement and work division. In rural areas, labor was traditionally divided among family members and split up according to seasonal opportunities. The basis of livelihoods for the majority was subsistence farming. “Women and men had different tasks – men for example ploughed, women seeded. When the season of preparing the field was finished, men would go to town [Goma] to look for jobs and gain money for extras like school,” men in a group discussion in

Kanyaruchinya explained. The temporal and spatial (family internal) division of labor has however been upset by the protracted conflict. Such seasonal work division has been abandoned in many researched areas in Masisi, Kitchanga, and Rutshuru due to recent displacements. As the harvest was lost, shared with IDPs and neighbors who lost their harvest, or stolen during the latest conflict (M23) there was no subsistence farming anymore at the time of the study; the balance of rural and urban income activities has been shaken. Both men and women flock to the urban centers – permanently or temporarily – to make up for the losses related to displacement and violence. **The traditional division of labor, according to which the working tasks of men and women had been strictly separated in the rural areas, cannot be upheld anymore. Further research and analysis needs to be conducted on how these changes caused by displacement are affecting division of labor in the long term and how, in turn, gender roles consequently have changed, or will change.**

Most rural families try to establish or strengthen established links with urban centers. They send their children there for education. Young men and women from rural backgrounds go to town to find a job (e.g. construction work, housemaids, porters, etc.). Those who appreciate the life in town and those who found a job often stay. Some stay despite their families moving back. Others bring their families, because “life in the villages is not secure. You prefer to have your family with you, in town,” (formerly displaced man, February 2014, Birere). Families whose livelihoods are centered in Goma or other urban centers try to maintain their link to rural areas and often engage in rural activities in and around town. Work is thereby divided more flexibly among family members in regards to tasks, space and time than before displacement. Mobility is therefore not only induced by insecurity; it can be linked to economic interests and resilience mechanisms.

The likelihood and extent of pendulum movements to the rural area, is determined by various factors: insecurity in the original villages, access to the fields, and level of repossession by others. IDPs are displaced from their original home by a few kilometers (e.g. Mweso town and surrounding villages), hours (e.g. Rutshuru – Busanza), a day’s walk (Goma-Kibumba), or beyond walking distance. Work opportunities for farmers accordingly range from daily to seasonal visits to the zones of origin depending on the distance to the area of displacement. If access is possible, especially in the rural areas, such pendulum movements are the IDPs’ preferred option. If their own fields are not accessible, IDPs work as cheap labor in fields closer to their refuge. Most workers encountered in the fields in the suburban area were in fact IDPs. Day labor accelerates the ongoing urbanization, as the flux of newcomers provides cheap labor and heightens demand for real estate.

Commuting is becoming a more common practice in general – both for IDPs and hosts. In Kanyaruchinya cohorts of young men can be seen leaving the village to go to Goma each day at 5:00 AM to look for day-labor opportunities and return each evening. Commuting extends to areas beyond the vicinities of Goma. Many from Kibumba for example leave their villages to go to town for three to four days because the distance to Goma is too great to commute every day. However, the low wages are not sufficient for savings to be invested in agricultural inputs (seeds, tools), and the daily commute leaves little time for young workers to engage in other economic activities. Wages are consumed by daily expenses for food, school money and health care, and many reported an increasing debt burden.

The population still resorts to traditional activities consisting mainly of farming, producing firewood, charcoal or planks, keeping livestock, and selling their products on the market in the rural area – working in

the transport, farming, service or domestic sector in mostly informal contexts in the urban area. However, social changes caused by protracted conflict have affected the ways livelihoods are implemented. Repeated shocks have resulted in the erosion of the single traditional livelihood people were used to. One key change observed in our research was diversification of livelihood activities. Families now adopt several livelihoods – usually keeping their traditional livelihood when possible – which are carried out by different members of the household. The division and variation of activities are organized within family network and take place on a rural-urban or urban-semi urban (suburban small scale farming) axis. **In sum, IDPs adapt to the protracted conflict with multiple-residencies to have a foot in both the rural and the urban area. These resilience mechanisms should be acknowledged and fostered.**

Adapting revenues: diversifying livelihoods

In urban areas in North Kivu livelihoods are volatile and jobs in the city are harder to get due to the increased supply of manpower owing to massive displacement. Even people in stable jobs, such as teachers, declare, “You cannot live on the salary,” (Rutshuru, March 2014). Often, agricultural activities are necessary to sustain a family in addition to a salaried job, though “stable jobs” are still rare, and the majority of people depend on different revenues and diverse livelihoods. As described above, IDPs and returnees are under additional pressure to diversify, offer competitive rates for services and accept low wages for labor (small commerce, agricultural labor, domestic labor, transport, etc). Urban IDPs in Goma are often incorporated into the informal economy as *Kilakas* [literally, somebody with a tattered shirt], a market “gofer” (for approximately \$0.50/day), hired hands digging sand (\$1 day), or as agricultural helpers (in exchange for food, or less than \$1/day). Many engage in petty trade. Women, especially young women, often resort to prostitution (for \$0.20-\$0.30/customer). In semi-urban areas like Ndosho, IDPs are hired by “autochtones” to claim land, or maintain a claim to land. The presence of an inhabitant justifies a claim to land and deters potential occupiers. In those areas IDPs are furthermore integrated as housekeepers, maids, and – similar to rural areas – as agricultural work force. Besides being employed, IDPs set up their own businesses and workshops: numerous small shops can, for example, be seen popping up in Mugunga. Also in the heart of the camp IDPs sell their products at the market – for example clothes they produce with sewing machines rented for \$10 USD a month. In regards to labor and income-generating activities, the situation of IDPs was seen to be quite similar to that of host communities.

Table 7: Entrepreneurial street children

Entrepreneurial street children

A 10-year old boy working as a porter (with a makeshift bicycle transporter called *chukudu*) earns 600 Francs (approx. \$0.65) for each transport of 120kg – together with a helper, who gets a share of 100 Francs (approx. \$0.11). The little boy is the eldest son in a single-mother IDP household. Whenever he manages to spare some Francs, he repays 300 for a 2,000F loan provided by a local association supporting *Maibobos* (street children) that he took to repair his *chukudu*. The device provides the only source of income, but without the association, he would not have been able to repair it. A man, who claims to have grown up in a tough context himself, says he started this association for the boys (he gave the loan in the beginning and manages the accounts now), because “they would turn into bandits otherwise!” (Birere, March 2014). This informal micro-credit system ultimately helps prevent street children from engaging in the market of violence through generating income and developing youth entrepreneurship.

While through the study a variety of intense shocks and stresses (due to conflict and displacement) were observed, it is worth noting that – despite these conditions – the population manages to cope with and adapt to these shocks and stresses. **The capacity of the local population to adapt to deteriorating conditions is extraordinary: each shock is encountered with dynamic resilience.** The frequency of shocks is nevertheless so high that the former state is rarely re-attained before the next shock occurs. The general picture, in consequence, cannot but depict a downward spiral. This, again, proves the level of resilience: not only one hit is taken, but several; not only one shock absorbed, but also one on top of the other. Trapped in a downward spiral families do not only manage to survive but host IDPs. In ever worsening conditions IDPs are integrated in a dwindling economy. Over 70% of IDPs are still hosted in communities that have been affected by twenty years of wars. The resilience of the population is beyond doubt.

Overall, the positive coping mechanisms developed by IDPs facing displacement in a protracted conflict can be observed in the: a) labor market where IDPs work as hired or independent workers (domestic, agricultural, informal and formal workshops); b) markets where IDPs participate as merchants (official and informal markets); c) the local service sector where IDP entrepreneurs set up small businesses and workshops (food stalls, tailor shop, hair salons, etc.); d) the local social community where IDPs integrate by networking (family, business partners, churches); e) civil society where they integrate by organizing themselves in associations (credit associations, village of origin associations, women/ youth/ aged people/IDPs association inside and outside camps). **The flexibility, mobility and creativity on the part of the IDPs are as remarkable as the level of solidarity, sharing, multiplying efforts shown by hosts.**

What is a durable solution?

The international community typically identifies three main durable solutions for internally displaced persons: return to area of origin, integration in the area of displacement and relocation to a third area. In the protracted conflict of North Kivu province, the humanitarian actors – both governmental and non-governmental – tend to primarily focus on the first two options: return and integration. It appears from the study that neither option seems fully adapted or adequate to the context of the “Petit North Kivu” considering resilience opportunities.

While some manage to establish and maintain a livelihood in town (even when return would be possible), others do not succeed satisfactorily and prefer to return to the rural area yet still maintain contacts they have established during their time in town. The latter are often the basis of new economic and social networks (exchange of goods and hosts for next displacement or other family members studying or working in town). Whether a person returns or not largely depends on the access to revenues in either place. On the one hand people will stay in another place if they find better options.

Table 8: Onions and metal: finding livelihood opportunities in urban areas

Onions and metal: finding livelihood opportunities in urban areas

Most onions and other vegetables sold in Goma are grown in Rutshuru. Close to the bus terminal in Rutshuru, wholesale shops and stands offering big reddish onions are lined up along the main road. Many onion traders in Goma have taken in IDPs from the Rutshuru area where they have had business connections before. “They have already been sending their children to stay with us to go to University here before,” they explained. There is a metal workshop near the onion shops where all of the workers said they hosted IDPs in 2013. All were friends – not kin. The owner of the metal workshop needed additional staff, and hired 6 IDPs hosted by his staff in January 2014. The IDPs, who were more than happy to have found a job after being unemployed for over a year, showed no inclination to go back to Rutshuru even after the rest of their family had returned. “Here we have work.” They had already moved out of the host’s packed apartment and rented a small room in Birere. Hence some prefer integrating into the host community permanently. Many IDPs manage to rent, or buy lots in Kitchanga, Sake, or Goma, and try to make a living there. IDPs marry partners from the place of refuge – and decide to stay. Married daughters bring their family – who get integrated as well.

Yet this does not mean that the option of return is abandoned. Most of the time, IDPs continue exploring opportunities for return. Additionally, the study clearly shows that integration of IDPs into the local community is less probable when IDPs stay in camps. Not everybody wants to stay in the place of exile; not everybody is able to expand his or her networks and integrate elsewhere. “There is no work in Goma”, young men in Kimoka explained. “Here, on the contrary, in the countryside you always find a little job.” After he had been expelled from a plantation in Sake he ended up in Mugunga camp, Goma. The plantation still does not offer jobs for him and other ex-workers; the houses and fields inside the plantation, used by their families since generations, remain off limits. A national police director, who had attained the necessary papers, had turned the whole plantation into a pasture. Yet the workers returned to Kimoka, found a “*patron*” who hosts them and now work in his fields. In addition to farming they produce planks. They hope to be able to rent rooms themselves soon.

IDPs show great level of adaptability and flexibility to integrate in the site of refuge and to cope with the prevailing situation in North Kivu. This said, apart from young men from Rutshuru who had found work in Birere as metal workers, virtually all IDPs said that if the condition were conducive, they would prefer to go back to their villages. An old man, who managed to have a house, an income, and a family, and who had been elected a local chief in Ndosho, explained that he would still prefer to go to his hometown. Back there he said, he was “strong, well known, and had many cattle.” He said his village was still held by FDLR members and that he therefore could not return yet. Most people interviewed pointed out the presence of armed groups and the insecure situation as the major obstacles for return. It seemed that no one had abandoned hope to return to the place of origin though.



Regarding areas where security had improved, most respondents reported they were highly motivated to return, but that they also felt there were numerous obstacles preventing their return. These obstacles, besides insecurity, are related to: burned houses, no access to fields, and loss of the little goods people had. The prospects of repeating these experiences combined with the shrinking capacities to restart farming, setting up housing etc. that are typical of a prolonged displacement – are legitimate reasons to have mixed views about return. Displaced populations also feel that they are not being supported in the process. “We were not accompanied, promises were not kept,” a schoolteacher who returned to the camp of Mugunga after having been involved in a return program to his village explained. He said they were told that the school would be transferred, but then they did not even have a building for the school in the village. The original building had been destroyed. So he decided to go back (to Mugunga) and take better care not to be fooled again (Lac Vert, February 2014). In this case assistance did not only fail to tap the momentum, but also blocked future opportunities to build upon the yearning to return. The desire expressed most often after an end of insecurity was to be accompanied by international organizations during return. However, various examples of spontaneous and unassisted returns were observed during our research (especially Kibati and Kibumba). Few community assets and services have to date been restored there, and villagers declared that they were still in the first stage of recovery (Kibati, February 2014). Yet in many places a rebuilding of networks and community, including those through reconciliation, was observed (Kiwanja March 2014). Assistance can build upon this high level of readiness to return and comprehensive recovery mechanisms.

Table 9: Return and reconstruction

Return and reconstruction

Buzanza is a village that has experienced multiple displacements. Located close to the Ugandan border, the village has been affected by each wave of fighting since 1998. The village has been destroyed, villagers have been displaced multiple times and insecurity is still high. Many villagers went to Rutshuru where they stayed with local hosts, or rented or bought a place to stay, and/or land to cultivate. Many found work in Rutshuru – as teachers, merchants, in informal jobs, etc. But most IDPs commute to their farmland in Buzanza. “Every morning from 5 a.m. onwards you see people walking up the road. Those are Buzanzas that go every day to do their farm work. If they do not go, they will not eat.” Recently the villagers formed an association to reconstruct the village and return to Buzanza. 95 families contribute to a credit trust. Every Sunday \$2 are collected from each member. The person who wants to construct a house has to prepare the building site, set up the poles and material. Then corrugated sheet metal for the roof is bought by the credit trust, and the whole community helps to build the house in a day. All houses will be built next to each other to heighten the security. The community is furthermore trying to stop the current banditry. “The insecurity is caused by our own children. The armed groups have recruited them. They just stayed to steal afterwards [when the M23 left]. We caught four boys of the age from 16 to 18. “Today we have to have a spirit of mutuality. No matter what your ethnicity is, we are all children of god.” (Buzanza, 5.3.14).

These examples of self-organized return can serve as a model: IDPs who are still working on their land are able to pay their rent, form an association to resettle, and organize land distribution for the resettlement. Associations of mutual help started by the population can be assisted to resettle. They can be accompanied in the process of establishing a centralized settlement along the road to heighten protection, helped with a land reform to guarantee the legal (or communal/ customary) status of property, and assisted to set up funds to provide material and manpower to build houses and farm fields.

Even so, the issue of landlessness remains the key. Restitution of land after displacement could not be observed in any area other than Rutshuru.⁹ The land lost in other areas, like in the Masisi/ Kitchanga area remains in the hand of the *patrons* who are profiting from the protracted conflict. The IDPs struggle to find reemployment after displacement, which is linked to the question of temporary access to land. Although it is desirable for reintegration to give temporary access to fields, the quality of temporary leases as well as the conditions of farm employment during displacement often augments vulnerability. The income of IDPs from informal and farming activities is just enough to slow down the impoverishment.

There is therefore a strong wish to return, which seems to be hampered by insecurity and lack of access to land, and conditioned by where one can find economic opportunities. However, **in the socio-economic context described above, to opt for both local integration and return is not a sign of being undecided but a sign of a decision to diversify revenues.** Return is often accompanied by new patterns

⁹Since 1994 it is nevertheless without precedence that an armed group was not able to reach a deal with the government in DRC – probably even since independence, cf. Turner, *The Congo Wars*.

of commuting, and diversification of residence – in other words, a partial urbanization and extended suburbanization. **The new patterns of residency and livelihoods are a true adaption process to the protracted conflict and a social resource worth promoting.** Such local integration in principle may pose a risk on food security since the work force may lack in the rural areas.

The study has demonstrated that IDPs in North Kivu province have opted for **hybrid durable solutions** where they build on resources in both the area of displacement and the area of return. The widespread practice of commuting between urban and rural areas to pursue all opportunities offered in both areas should be fostered and facilitated (as long as insecurity and major obstacles to access services, resources and incomes prevail), as it promotes resilience as well as social cohesion. In this context, **categorizing long-term solutions between return, integration and relocation does not fully capture the coping strategies used by the IDPs of North Kivu, and could potentially hamper relevant targeting and program design.** The study therefore advocates for refining definitions of durable solutions for Internal Displaced Persons in North Kivu and for the promotion of existing resilience mechanisms – in particular mobility and flexibility – amongst affected population in North Kivu.

The identification of any durable solution in North Kivu should be informed by the following: (i) rule of law and legal framework –what human rights are Congolese displaced persons entitled to including freedom of movement per the Congolese constitution (where do people choose to live); (ii) support mobility as this is the primary resilience mechanism in North Kivu; (iii) promote social cohesion through improved targeting and equitable access to services.

Table 10: Section 3 key findings and recommendations

KEY FINDINGS

- Affected populations use a variety of mechanisms to cope with shocks including: keeping a low profile, using resources found in camps, multiplication of residences, livelihood diversification (one foot here, one foot there)
- People have a very negative image of camps and camp residents
- People usually do not resort to only one coping mechanism; they combine a variety of options
- The choice of coping mechanism(s) is dependent on several factors including: economic opportunities and access to land, social networks, security, prioritization of needs
- Multiples movements are not necessarily linked to insecurity; they can be determined by economic opportunities.
- The international community's definitions of durable solutions for IDPs do not seem fully adapted to the context of North Kivu.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Land reform and access to land should be at the center of the definition of durable solutions.
- The analysis of the push and pull factors which influence a choice of coping mechanism should be further developed.
- The level of assistance and infrastructure outside of the camps should be higher than in the camps.
- Livelihood diversification – taking into consideration commuting approaches and the process of urbanization – should be facilitated and reinforced.
- The national legal framework in DRC should be reviewed in order to promote rights-based responses to displacements; and multiply advocacy initiatives to ensure the rights of all the Congolese are protected.

4

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Humanitarian assistance in North Kivu has been and remains critical to addressing life-threatening risks in a highly insecure environment. Over the years, it has provided essential safety nets to populations affected by repeated shocks (human rights abuses and displacement), fulfilling its foremost objectives of protecting lives and ensuring support to basic needs. However, in a fragile context of chronic crisis like the one of North Kivu province, the international community must more fully analyze conflict dynamics by understanding historical drivers of the conflict and interests of various stakeholders when defining their strategies and intervention. Humanitarian assistance has mostly been confined to emergency responses, overlooking hosting arrangements in urban areas and targeting IDPs in camps through a statutory approach. This has contributed to the creation of divisions and tensions between hosts and IDPs because of inadequate vulnerability assessments and selective assistance. Further the humanitarian aid community continues in its struggle identify and implement exit strategies, and most humanitarian funding is renewed on a short-term basis and is mostly invested in camps. This creates pull factors which make it hard to foster opportunities for self-reliance and durable solutions for displaced populations.

Emergency support should only be provided to those who cannot meet their basic needs. In order to change the prevailing acute vulnerabilities generated by violence and multiple displacements, the international community and other stakeholders must be rigorous and determine how much of a given type of intervention (e.g. unconditional distribution of goods, conditional support to livelihood opportunities, facilitative approaches with limited external support, etc.) is needed to cross a threshold or tipping point and design relevant exit strategies. Only then will humanitarian action not hamper community resilience and do more good than harm. Emergency response should integrate early recovery and resilience strategies from the onset and should envision joint approaches with development aid in order to respond to crosscutting needs and increase positive and longer-term impacts on the protection of affected population. The separation of short-term urgent aid and long-term development aid is increasingly criticized: “Without strengthened links between the development and humanitarian sectors we will be unsuccessful in building communities’ resilience in DRC” [DFID, 2013]. DFID summarizes a recent assessment on the question of how to link humanitarian and development programs in the following way:

"The impact of recurring shocks can be reduced by responding in a smarter way at the outset, even if this makes the initial response more costly. Humanitarian actors are being asked to respond to a wide range of needs, not only addressing acute threats to lives and livelihoods but also supporting reintegration and livelihoods recovery. Ultimately, however, the short-term nature of humanitarian response, and its focus on acute vulnerability, means that it cannot provide the longer-term solutions required." [DFID, 2013]

This study has demonstrated that affected populations in North Kivu are extremely resourceful in face of repeated shocks and are implementing a variety of positive resilience mechanisms. It is telling that over 70% of IDPs are supported by host communities/families. These mechanisms are nonetheless eroding owing to

prolonged displacements and limited or lack of support. Humanitarian assistance should be careful not to “...undermine traditional coping mechanisms and limit the choices available to IDPs” [Davies, 2012]. There is a great potential for saving more lives and reaching more people through supporting these mechanisms while addressing some of the root causes of the conflict such as inter-community tensions. The primary focus of humanitarian response should switch from IDPs to affected communities as a whole, including displaced people; therefore reinforcing Do No Harm approaches and social cohesion. This will also improve efficiency (value for money) of the response to large-scale displacements in a context of decreasing funding for emergency response. IDP camps cannot and should not be long term solutions to displacements. In addition to keeping displaced persons in a state of limbo, they present risks to the overall stability of the province. However, it is critical to ensure that the transition out of camps is planned, right-based and considers protection concerns in accordance with Congolese and international laws. The promotion of leadership and accountability of state authorities as well as a better understanding of urbanization and displacement in urban settings as major movement trends in North Kivu province will be essential in this process. Innovative and systemic approaches, based on in-depth evidence-informed analysis, are of paramount importance to prevent future violence against civilians and to build a protective environment in North Kivu.



5

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations below are based on the case study findings identified through an exploratory qualitative methodology. There are still significant knowledge/information gaps, which are outlined in the following section. The recommendations apply to the geographical areas assessed (i.e. Kitchanga – Goma – Rutshuru axis or “Petit Nord Kivu”) but could potentially be applicable to the rest of the province should additional study be conducted in the northern parts of the province. While some of the recommendations are aimed at specific actors, most of them are of interest to all stakeholders involved in assistance delivery in North Kivu:

Conflict and Governance

1. Conduct an up-to-date **key stakeholder analysis** of different actors in and around the conflict in order to understand the dynamic of conflicts and ensure the design of programs that are conflict sensitive. Due to the sensitive nature of such an analysis, issues of confidentiality will have to be considered.
2. Ensure the **findings of research on land, identity and power conflicts and governance are shared widely** to produce concrete recommendations to be implemented by the Congolese government with support from the international community.
3. International organizations, in particular UN agencies, should **advocate for both land and agricultural reforms at national, provincial and local levels**, in order to promote and protect the rule of law, the enforcement of human rights, and lay the ground for sustainable peace and development.
4. To address the root causes of conflict, **bottom-up mediation and reconciliation initiatives should be prioritized** and initiatives that promote the rule of law should be encouraged.
5. Ensure humanitarian and development interventions are designed in due consideration of the market of violence in order to be able to assess positive and negative impacts of aid at a macro-level, and systematically include objectives that address the root causes of conflict.
6. Indicators of good governance and community monitoring mechanisms should systematically be established to **measure the accountability of all aid or service providers** (Government, local and international aid workers, and civil society organizations among others), and these indicators should be made public.

Design of Responses to Displacements

1. In light of the tensions evolving around the **definition of vulnerability**, the international community should revise its targeting approaches, **distinguishing between acute and chronic**

needs. An adequate response would aim at responding to immediate needs when a shock occurs, while supporting the affected population in building and/or reinforcing their resilience mechanisms. **Clear timing and sharp criteria** as to when humanitarian and when development actors should engage should be elaborated from the onset to enable complementarity and smooth transition between humanitarian and development action. In order to be able to do so, it would be essential to develop a mapping of existing or planned development financing. Additionally, the question whether the **cluster system** is best placed and equipped to address and respond in this situation of protracted conflict has to be examined.

2. Similarly, with regards to the contested definition of vulnerabilities, aid actors should **consider long-term stresses** as much as punctual shocks, and **prioritize community-based and community-driven interventions in areas of displacement** over individual-based/statutory responses.
3. The aspects of the national legal framework in DRC concerning displacements should be reviewed in order to promote right-based responses to displacements, and multiply advocacy initiatives to ensure that the rights of all the Congolese are protected.
4. The population in major areas or axes of displacement should be assisted in absorbing the shocks. Instead of trying to improve standards and control in camps, the focus should be put on offering better alternatives outside the camps. The level of assistance and infrastructure outside of the camps should be **higher than in the camps**.
5. **Hosting arrangements, particularly in urban settings** (in accordance with the major population movement trends), should be given more consideration by the Government and the international community in order to ensure better living conditions and mitigate tensions within the community.
6. Humanitarian interventions should create (socio-economic) opportunities for people – in particular the youth – to **stay aside from the market of violence, therefore breaking vicious circles**. **Market facilitation and job creation programming** could help address adverse practices such as pirate markets and undercut salaries, which disrupt existing markets and local resilience of the host communities and increase the potential for violence. **New patterns of residency (between rural and urban areas through commuting) and livelihood diversification** should be facilitated and reinforced.

Necessary further studies

1. IDP camps do not exist in other provinces. It would be interesting to **compare displacement dynamics across provinces of the DRC** to better understand the specificities of North Kivu as part of a longer-term research initiative.
2. Displacement/mobility dynamics should be further analyzed and understood in order to identify systemic approaches efficient in addressing population needs. In this respect, a detailed analysis of how displacements affect populations depending on age and gender should be conducted.
3. The analysis of the **push and pull factors** which influence a choice of coping mechanism in face of repeated displacements should be further developed.

6

APPENDIX A **METHODOLOGY**

APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGY

The research is meant to support the development of strategies of relief and development actors in DRC on two different levels: a) a better comprehension of the existing problems and common coping strategies to forced displacement; and b) a clearer vision of the best practices in humanitarian and development interventions addressing forced displacement that ensure positive impact and reduce the risk of unintended consequences.

6.1. Research questions

The principal research interest of the consortium is to identify ways of mitigating vulnerabilities due to forced displacement and of developing sustainable solutions in a context of chronic displacement.¹⁰

The general objectives of the research in consequence are:

- To develop a better understanding of the populations' own perspective on how they have been and continue to be affected by massive and long-term displacements;
- To examine how displacements have affected inter- and intra-community dynamics and protection mechanisms;
- To compare vulnerabilities amongst communities with IDPs and returnees who receive humanitarian assistance and those who do not, and communities not hosting IDPs / returnees;
- To identify the ways in which affected populations have coped and are still coping with shocks, when provided with limited/ insufficient or no humanitarian assistance;
- To analyze the impact of prolonged emergency assistance on traditional coping mechanisms, community resilience, local conflict dynamics and the protective environment;
- And to empower affected populations to identify the most relevant responses to their vulnerabilities.

The following working hypotheses were synthesized from these objectives:

- There is a deficit of knowledge about resilience mechanisms and about the negative effects of prolonged humanitarian assistance.
- Development is hindered by the difficulty to overcome expectations of statutory assistance.
- Humanitarian assistance does not focus enough on urban displacement dynamics.
- Humanitarian assistance neither takes the Do no Harm approach nor local integration opportunities for IDPs sufficiently into account.

¹⁰ The necessity of life saving activities recognizing that emergency activities should be time framed and encompass exist strategies from the onset remains notwithstanding the crucial day-to-day business.

Summarizing these issues, our field research centered on two main research questions:

- What are the differences between community members that have received humanitarian assistance and those who have not?
- What are the key dynamics of integration and/or exclusion between hosts and IDPs in urban and rural areas?

6.2. Analytical framework

In order to narrow down the focus of the study, the **Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) Model**, developed by Michael Cernea, was adopted as the assessment's analytical framework. Cernea's model delineates the risks that come with displacement (the causes of impoverishment) and what can be done to address them and to reconstitute livelihoods at the same time. These factors influence one another both in terms of impoverishment outcomes and desired actions [Cernea, 2000]. Cernea's approach helps to deconstruct the multi-faceted displacement experience into identifiable components. As the model suggests, it is important to understand how power and resources are shared, managed and contested, and how this influences impoverishment patterns and risk reversal strategies. Our research confirmed that the IRR model is applicable for and corresponds to the DRC context: several respondents listed similar risks that they consider to correlate with displacement.

Kalin and Schrepfer highlight how development actors can easily adapt the IRR model as a tool to understand the challenges faced in displacement [Schrepfer & Kälin, 2012]. Particularly useful in this regard is the fact that the model stresses an action-oriented analysis. The IRR model suggests that preventing or overcoming the pattern of impoverishment requires targeted risk reversal or mitigation [Cernea, 2004]. The analysis presented here proposes to follow Kalin and Schrepfer's adaptation of the list of risks leading to impoverishment and the processes needed to reverse or mitigate them. These are helpful in stressing the conditions necessary for creating the basis for IDPs and the host community to achieve durable solutions respectively and bring an end to forced displacement. Kalin and Schrepfer reformulated the list of IRR processes as follows:

Figure 4: Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction model

From landlessness to access to/ restitution of land after, or temporary use of land during, displacement
From joblessness to reemployment after, or temporary employment during, displacement
From homelessness to temporary shelter during, and permanent housing after, displacement
From marginalization to social inclusion both during and after displacement

From food insecurity to adequate food and nutrition during and after displacement
From increased morbidity to improved health care during and after displacement
From loss of common property to restoration of community assets and services
From social disarticulation to rebuilding of networks and community during and after displacement, including through reconciliation
From loss of educational opportunities to restoration of access to education

These indicators, in sum, make it possible to differentiate between impoverishment and re-integration on all levels. The indicators can be used to measure the effects of displacement for IDPs and hosts alike. During this research, it was found that while the urgency of the different issues varied according to the situation IDPs or locals were in, all were concerned with each issue in one form or the other.

Looking at the first three indicators (a, b, c) of the proposed analytical model already shows how in a rural context where the basis of farming is a non-monetary self-sufficiency, the lack of land would trigger a vicious circle that will be discussed in further detail below. Beyond such apparent (first-layer) vicious circles, analysis has to be able to identify other such structures. Different layers of systems precede, condition, or form each other. Which structural conditions, for example, are hindering individuals' access to land? These structural interdependencies need another analytical model (Coleman u. a. 2011; Carayannis 2003). The market of violence was introduced as a model that makes it possible to identify interests of actors that might run contrary to peace building efforts [Elwert, 1999]. The market of violence is characterized by a thriving economy of fear based on the possible use of uncontrollable violence. The need for actors to manage their resources efficiently establishes a specific logic of rational behavior in a market of violence, as mentioned above: acts of violence and threats to act violently reify and stabilize the market of violence.

This specific logic of action can be called highly strategic or instrumental action, as it is defined by utilitarian considerations only. Accordingly the following system imperatives are postulated for the field of research: actors a) use and reproduce violence, b) consequently resist attempt by the state to monopolize violence, and c) undermine institutionalized conflict resolution insofar as it would reduce the fundament of the entrepreneurs of violence. A system-analytical approach, in sum, helps (i) to differentiate the components of self-perpetual circles that are opposed to development goals, (ii) to recognize the rationality of actors in a market of violence, and (iii) to identify the interdependencies of a market of violence and international humanitarian aid.

6.3. Tools and limitations

The methodology for the study consisted of qualitative research tools (available on demand). Data was drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected through a participatory assessment with displaced populations and host communities without creating undue expectations. The team¹¹ conducted over 400 interviews and focus group discussions in the course of four weeks. Due attention was paid to (i) mainstreaming age, gender, and diversity; and (ii) to ensuring that interviewees (displaced and non-displaced groups) were not exposed to any risks resulting from sharing personal and sensitive information. A continuous review of available documents was carried out to ensure that all relevant information available is included in the final analysis.

The applied methods of inquiry included focus group discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews. In addition, on the spot observation, genealogical analysis, sociograms, and visual documentation (photos, drawings) accompanied the research to ensure that each case was approached from different perspective. Throughout the implementation of the study, research questions and approaches were adapted as needed. Methodological checkpoints were included in the design through a combination of methods in order to crosscheck information [Elwert, 2003], and staff was trained in triangulation to check and flexibly alter eventual individual presumptions facilitating a bias-free analysis [Burke & Eichler, 2006].

Compared to classical field research a multi-located research approach delivers an enlarged view on the phenomena in question, but a less complete picture of each location [Marcus, 1995; Schlee, 2002; Werthmann, Grätz & Hahn, 2004]. Random and snowball methods were used to counter this limitation. Team members were encouraged to not only tolerate serendipity, but to actively follow all leads evolving from coincidences that enriched their understanding of relevant facts. Explorative research and interviews with experts helped to identify ideal-typical sites featuring the characteristics believed to be central for the research.

¹¹The analysis was designed with a teamwork approach, stressing dialogue and communication. A Congolese counterpart (Fonds Social) furthermore helped to adapt the approach to local conditions during the whole process (selection, training and research). The team elaborated research subjects/ dimensions, discussion themes, and interview lead questions in a participative assessment. The tools were developed in French and translated into Swahili. The team elaborated on the distinction of local and international concepts such as vulnerability and resilience. The team was trained in participatory methods to engage local population (participative theatre, drawings and follow-up FGD). To guarantee a gender balance the team consisted of female (3) and male (3) researchers. Their age ranged from the twenties to forties, their status from student to executive. They were recruited from the Kivus through a transparent selection process, spoke the local languages (Swahili, Kinyarwanda), and had social networks in the area. Coming from different backgrounds, the team members all had received their respective training in suboptimal conditions. It should be kept in mind that the standard of education in the DRC cannot be compared to other regions and that no researcher had a truly professional social science background.

The locations that fulfilled these requirements were found in the following neighborhoods of Goma, and in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, and Masisi territories:

Table 11 - Target locations and populations

Geographic Area	Axis Kitchanga – Goma– Rutshuru, North Kivu, DRC
Target populations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population in IDP camps/ sites (urban and rural) • Returnees • Refugees (cross-border dynamics) • Population in hosting arrangement (urban and rural) • Local communities (not hosting) for comparison purposes
Goma	Birere, Ndosho, Mugunga, Bulengo/ Lac-Vert
Nyiragongo/ Rutshuru (axis Goma-Rutshuru)	Kanyaruchinya, Mutaho, Kibati, Kibumba, Ntamugenga, Kiwanja, Bunagana, Jomba, Tshanzu
Masisi (axis Sake /Mweso)	Sake, Kimoka, Rutoboko, Kirolirwe , Burungu, Kitchanga, Mungote/ Kahe, Mweso

Statistical or representative results are by definition not included in this exploratory and qualitative research. Other limitations occurred, including limited access to target communities. Due to security concerns it was neither possible to do research in the late evening or at night, nor to access the zones of current insecurity, nor to access international refugee camps. A lot of activities in the camps start after 17:00, as most camp inhabitants have to make their living outside the camps during the day. All information about the zones that were under control of armed groups like APCLS or FDLR were second hand only. Members of these groups including their leaders were not targeted in this study, but it should be kept in mind that questions like access to the land of IDPs, the actual use of the land in these zones, or the situation in the international refugee camps could not be crosschecked.

6.4. Research sites

Goma (Capital of North Kivu, population: over 1 million)

- **Birere.** Birere is the city's main commercial district. It was chosen as a site that has not been directly affected by displacement – no camps exist and it has not been a target of assistance for displaced persons.
- **Ndosho.** Ndosho is one of largest neighborhoods on the outskirts of Goma. It is hosting a high number of displaced persons from Masisi and Rutshuru. It is a zone of on-going urbanization. The

process of rapid growth started after the volcanic eruption of 2002 that devastated large parts of Goma. The government has not kept up with the pace of growth in regard of infrastructures such as schools, hospitals, water, or electricity.

- **Mugunga.** Mugunga¹ is the oldest and largest of the spontaneous camps in Goma. It is home to approximately 50,000 residents. Mugunga³ is one of Goma's largest displaced camps managed with the help of UNHCR, with an estimated population of 53,000 IDPs. Both host IDPs from Masisi and Rutshuru territories. Interviews were also conducted in the surrounding district of Mugunga, outside the camp. The district is another case of rapid urban growth.
- **Bulengo/Lac-Vert.** Bulengo is a displaced camp west of Goma that has benefited from little humanitarian assistance lately. Camp population has increased to up to 60,000 residents following the recent surge in violence in Masisi territory. A number of displaced persons also reside in host families in the neighboring district of Lac-Vert.

Nyiragongo/ Rutshuru (axe Goma-Rutshuru)

- **Kanyaruchinya/ Mutaho.** Kanyaruchinya is a semi-urban area beyond the outskirts of Goma, which was heavily affected by the combats in 2013. It was a major site of spontaneous IDP settlements that received belated assistance due to security concerns. Mutaho is a small settlement located off the Goma-Rutshuru axis. It was the frontline during most of the M23 insurgency and suffered from heavy fighting and destruction. Most of the population fled to Goma during the combats and returned after M23's defeat in October-November 2013.
- **Kibati.** The *groupement* of Kibati is the first populated area north of Goma on the Goma-Rutshuru axis. The area was the frontline between the FARDC and the M23 rebel movement, and most of the population fled to Goma during the combats. Since the defeat of M23 in October-November 2013, the population has returned to Kibati.
- **Kibumba.** Kibumba was occupied by M23 until its defeat, and its population suffered from heavy fighting. As of today, the area receives little humanitarian assistance.
- **Ntamugenga.** Ntamugenga is a village located off the Goma-Rutshuru axis. It is an area of return for displaced persons who fled during military operations; yet, it does not so far receive humanitarian assistance.
- **Kiwanja.** More than 6,500 IDPs are hosted in Kiwanja's three displaced camps. The population of Kiwanja has become very critical of the camps.
- **Bunagana/ Jomba/ Tshanzu.** Bunagana, located on the border with Uganda, was the political headquarters of M23 in 2012-2013. The town has known various movements of the population according to the evolution of the military situation. Jomba houses the biggest school and an important hospital in the region – the catholic church running the complex has been playing an important role in assistance to refugees and IDPs in the area. Tshanzu was the military headquarters of the M23 movement. Whereas displaced Hutu who fled during the M23 occupation are now returning to the zone, a number of Tutsi have fled towards Uganda in the aftermath of M23's defeat.

Masisi (axe Sake – Mweso)

- **Sake/ Kimoka/ Rutoboko.** Sake is a middle-sized city west of Goma, on the edge of the Kivu mountain range. Its location made it of strategic importance, and Sake has been the theatre of heavy fighting on several occasions over the past years (including 2006, 2007 and 2012). Big plantations that make it difficult for locals to have access to land surround it. Tensions between the population and the owners of the plantations are high. Kimoka is a neighborhood of Sake with a high concentration of displaced persons living in host families. It also hosts a number of returnees, who are on their way from Goma to their living areas in Masisi. Rutoboko is a neighborhood of Sake, which supposedly does not host displaced persons.
- **Kilolirwe.** Kilolirwe was the former headquarters of the Tutsi-dominated CNDP rebel movement (2006-2009). Founded in times of the RCD around 2000-2002, it is now mostly populated by Tutsi who have returned from refugee camps in Rwanda in the wake of the CNDP insurgency. They claim to have been prevented from returning to their home areas in Masisi by FDLR elements.
- **Burungu.** Repeatedly displaced. Hunde autochthons have been displaced except the chief who remains. The majority of the population has sought refuge in Burungu from the surrounding villages.
- **Kitchanga.** Kitchanga is one of the largest towns in Masisi territory. The town has suffered from a succession of conflicts, and ethnic tensions are high between Hunde, Hutu and Tutsi communities. Resident families in the town host a number of displaced persons.
- **Mungote&Kahe.** Mungote and Kahe are two displaced camps on the outskirts of Kitchanga, with an estimated population of 15,500 and 7,000 respectively. Kahe is mainly populated by Tutsi, while 95 percent of Mungote residents are Hutu.
- **Mweso.** Surrounded by insecurity, Mweso camps largely host villagers from the vicinity who often still commute to their fields. Headquarter of five major NGOs who provide services to the population and IDPs.

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APPENDIX B **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

APPENDIX B – BIBLIOGRAPHY

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